Coercive Nuclear Campaigns in the 21st Century; Understanding Adversary Incentives and Options for Nuclear Escalation by Lieber, Keir & Press, Daryl
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2013-04-04
Coercive Nuclear Campaigns in the 21st
Century; Understanding Adversary
Incentives and Options for Nuclear Escalation
Lieber, Keir
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/34337
MARCH 2013  |  REPORT NUMBER 2013-001
Coercive Nuclear Campaigns 
in the 21st Century
Understanding Adversary Incentives and 
Options for Nuclear Escalation
Keir A. Lieber, PhD
Georgetown University
Daryl G. Press, PhD
Dartmouth College




Coercive Nuclear Campaigns in the 21st Century 




Keir A. Lieber 




Daryl G. Press 







This report is the product of collaboration between Keir Lieber, Daryl Press, the Naval 
Postgraduate School Center on Contemporary Conflict, and the Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency. 
 
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect 
the official policy or position of the Naval Postgraduate School, the Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government. 
 
This report is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
 
            
 
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
Center on Contemporary Conflict (CCC) 
Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for  
Countering WMD (PASCC) 
Project Cost: $99,808 
 
PASCC Report Number: 2013-001 	  	  	  
	   	   	  	  
	  
2	  
	  	   	  
	  	  
The Naval Postgraduate School Center on Contemporary Conflict is the 
research wing of the Department of National Security Affairs (NSA) and 
specializes in the study of international relations, security policy, and 
regional studies. One of the CCC’s programs is the Project on Advanced 
Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC). PASCC operates 
as a program planning and implementation office, research center, and 
intellectual clearinghouse for the execution of analysis and future-oriented 
studies and dialogues for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.  
 
For further information, please contact: 
 
The Center on Contemporary Conflict 
Naval Postgraduate School 
1411 Cunningham Road 







	   	   	  	  
	  
3	  
TABLE	  OF	  CONTENTS	  
EXECUTIVE	  SUMMARY	  ........................................................................................................................	  4	  
INTRODUCTION	  ....................................................................................................................................	  7	  
THE	  LOGIC	  OF	  COERCIVE	  NUCLEAR	  ESCALATION	  ...................................................................	  13	  
Escalation	  and	  the	  Fate	  of	  Enemy	  Leaders	  ...........................................................................................	  14	  
Escalation	  and	  the	  Role	  of	  Nuclear	  Weapons	  ......................................................................................	  16	  
IS	  ESCALATION	  RATIONAL?	  POSING	  FOUR	  GRIM	  OPTIONS	  .................................................	  19	  
EVIDENCE	  OF	  COERCIVE	  NUCLEAR	  DOCTRINES	  .......................................................................	  26	  
IDENTIFYING	  THE	  MOST	  DANGEROUS	  CONFLICTS	  .................................................................	  31	  
Plausibility	  of	  Conquest	  .............................................................................................................................	  32	  
Vulnerability	  to	  Regime	  Change	  ..............................................................................................................	  33	  
Blinding	  and	  Disarming	  Military	  Operations	  .....................................................................................	  35	  
Escalation	  Risks	  in	  Potential	  Conventional	  Conflicts	  .......................................................................	  38	  
COUNTERARGUMENTS	  .....................................................................................................................	  41	  
CONCLUSION	  ........................................................................................................................................	  44	  
Implications	  for	  War	  Plans	  and	  Conventional	  CONOPS	  ..................................................................	  44	  
Implications	  for	  U.S.	  Nuclear	  Force	  Structure	  ....................................................................................	  46	  	  
	   	  
	   	   	  	  
	  
4	  
EXECUTIVE	  SUMMARY	  This	  report	  examines	  why	  and	  how	  regional	  powers	  armed	  with	  nuclear	  weapons	  may	   employ	   those	   weapons	   coercively	   against	   the	   United	   States	   or	   U.S.	   allies	   during	   a	  conventional	   war.	   	   We	   argue	   that	   the	   problem	   of	   intra-­‐war	   deterrence	   –	   preventing	  nuclear-­‐armed	  adversaries	  from	  escalating	  during	  a	  conventional	  conflict	  –	  is	  arguably	  the	  most	  important	  deterrence	  challenge	  facing	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  21st	  century.	  The	   strategic	   environment	   facing	   the	   United	   States,	   its	   allies,	   and	   its	   potential	  adversaries	   has	   changed	   dramatically	   since	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Cold	   War.	   	   For	   nearly	   four	  decades,	   the	  United	  States	  and	   its	  NATO	  allies	  planned	  to	  use	  nuclear	  weapons	  to	  defend	  themselves	   from	   a	   major	  Warsaw	   Pact	   invasion	   of	  Western	   Europe.	   	   The	   armies	   of	   the	  Warsaw	  Pact	  were	  perceived	  to	  be	  too	  formidable	  to	  confront	  with	  a	  strictly	  conventional	  defense	  –	  at	  least	  at	  spending	  levels	  that	  would	  be	  acceptable	  to	  the	  North	  Atlantic	  alliance.	  	  Nuclear	   weapons	   were	   thus	   NATO’s	   “trump	   card”:	   NATO	   planned	   to	   employ	   nuclear	  weapons	   coercively	   during	   a	   war	   to	   raise	   the	   costs	   and	   risks	   to	   the	   Warsaw	   Pact	   and	  thereby	   convince	   them	   to	   halt	   their	   military	   operations	   before	   they	   could	   inflict	   a	   total	  defeat	  on	  NATO.	  	  	  Today,	   the	   global	   balance	   of	   power	   is	   reversed.	   	   Now	  U.S.	  military	   forces	   are	   the	  most	  formidable,	  and	  potential	  U.S.	  adversaries	  need	  trump	  cards	  of	  their	  own	  to	  stalemate	  the	   United	   States.	   	   This	   reversal	   in	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   helps	   explain	   why	   the	   United	  States	   now	   seeks	   to	   delegitimize	   nuclear	   weapons	   and	   reduce	   their	   role	   in	   the	   world.	  	  Unfortunately,	   the	   same	   conditions	   that	   once	  made	   NATO	   rely	   on	   nuclear	   weapons	  will	  now	   likely	  compel	  other	  countries	  –	   including	  several	  potential	  U.S.	   adversaries	  –	   to	   rely	  upon	  nuclear	  weapons.	  In	   today’s	   world,	   relatively	   weaker	   adversaries	   face	   a	   range	   of	   incentives	   and	  options	   to	   use	   nuclear	   weapons	   coercively	   during	   conventional	   conflicts.	   	   Facing	  conventionally	   superior	   foes,	   regional	   nuclear-­‐armed	   states	  will	   worry	   deeply	   about	   the	  consequences	   of	   military	   defeat.	   	   Recent	   history	   shows	   that	   such	   defeats	   are	   often	  extraordinarily	  costly	   for	  adversary	   leadership	  –	  as	   the	   fate	  of	  Manuel	  Noriega,	  Slobodan	  Milošević,	   Radovan	   Karadžić,	   Saddam	   Hussein,	   and	   Muammar	   Qaddafi	   demonstrate	   so	  starkly.	   	   Therefore,	   regional	   adversaries	   face	   powerful	   incentives	   to	   employ	   nuclear	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weapons	  coercively	  to	  stalemate	  their	  opponents	  before	  suffering	  major	  battlefield	  defeats	  and	  the	  attendant	  catastrophic	  consequences.	  The	   logical	   appeal	   of	   coercive	   nuclear	   escalation	   is	   well	   understood	   by	   countries	  around	  the	  world.	  	  The	  strategy	  appears	  to	  be	  reflected	  in	  the	  defense	  plans	  and	  doctrines	  of	  key	  states.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  countries	  that	  appear	  to	  have	  internalized	  the	  strategic	  logic	  of	  coercive	   nuclear	   escalation	   are	   the	   same	   ones	   predicted	   to	   do	   so	   according	   to	   the	  arguments	  in	  this	  report.	  Some	  conflicts	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  escalate	  than	  others.	  	  Some	  of	  the	  world’s	  nuclear	  “hotspots”	  are	  more	  dangerous	  than	  others.	   	  Threats	  to	  invade	  and	  conquer	  an	  adversary	  and	   overthrow	   its	   regime	   are	   obviously	   the	  most	   escalatory,	   but	   other	   kinds	   of	   conflicts	  offer	   grounds	   for	   deep	   concern.	   	   Military	   campaigns	   that	   significantly	   degrade	   an	  adversary’s	   ability	   to	   defend	   itself,	   military	   operations	   that	   target	   adversary	   strategic	  assets,	  and	  conflicts	  that	  make	  regime	  downfall	  more	  likely	  if	  the	  adversary	  fails	  to	  achieve	  its	  political	  objectives	  all	  contain	  the	  seeds	  of	  escalation.	  	  The	  principal	  implications	  of	  this	  study	  for	  U.S.	  policy	  makers	  can	  be	  summarized	  in	  five	  points:	  	  
• U.S.	   adversaries	   have	   powerful	   incentives	   to	   use	   nuclear	   weapons	   against	   the	  United	  States	  during	  conventional	  wars.	  	  The	  same	  logic	  that	  led	  NATO	  to	  adopt	  a	   strategy	   of	   coercive	   nuclear	   escalation	   during	   the	   Cold	  War	  will	   likely	   drive	  future	  U.S.	  adversaries	  to	  do	  the	  same	  to	  stalemate	  the	  United	  States.	  	  
• History	   suggests	   that	   most	   nuclear-­‐armed	   countries	   that	   face	   overwhelming	  conventional	  military	  threats	  develop,	  and	  rely	  upon,	  coercive	  nuclear	  doctrines.	  	  
• Most	  of	  the	  world’s	  most	  dangerous	  conflicts	  –	  i.e.,	  those	  that	  create	  the	  greatest	  incentives	   for	   combatants	   to	  use	  nuclear	  weapons	  –	   involve	   the	  United	  States:	  including	  war	  on	   the	  Korean	  Peninsula,	   conflicts	   in	  maritime	  East	  Asia,	   and	   in	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the	  future	  war	  in	  the	  Strait	  of	  Hormuz.	  (The	  most	  notable	  non-­‐U.S.	  conflict	  which	  involves	  high	  nuclear	  escalation	  risks	  is	  India-­‐Pakistan.)	  	  
• Because	  the	  United	  States	  seeks	  to	  prevent	  escalation	  during	  conventional	  wars,	  regional	  war	  planners	  need	   to	   fully	   integrate	   the	  goal	  of	   escalation	  prevention	  into	  the	  foundation	  of	  their	  war	  plans	  and	  conventional	  concepts	  of	  operations	  (CONOPS).	   	  Existing	  “limited	  aims”	  plans	  may	  pursue	  limited	  objectives	  without	  restraining	  U.S.	  military	  operations	  sufficiently	  to	  mitigate	  escalation	  risks.	  	  	  	  
• The	   challenges	   of	   deterring	   escalation	   during	   conventional	  wars,	   and	   assuring	  allies	  during	   those	  conflicts,	  place	  a	  premium	  on	   flexible	  U.S.	   conventional	  and	  nuclear	  forces.	  	  Proposals	  regarding	  the	  size	  and	  composition	  of	  the	  U.S.	  nuclear	  arsenal	   should	   assess	   the	   proposed	   force	   against	   the	   challenge	   of	   deterring	  intra-­‐war	  escalation,	  and	  not	  just	  the	  mission	  of	  peacetime	  deterrence.	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INTRODUCTION	  The	  most	   critical	   question	   about	   nuclear	   weapons	   in	   the	   21st	   century	   is	   whether	  states	   will	   ever	   use	   them	   again.	   	   Is	   the	   possibility	   of	   inter-­‐state	   nuclear	   war	   sufficiently	  
plausible	  to	  be	  a	  major	  concern?	  	  In	  the	  coming	  decades,	  are	  there	  realistic	  circumstances	  in	  which	  states	  might	  choose	   to	  use	  nuclear	  weapons	  against	  enemies,	   including	   the	  United	  States?	   	   In	   short,	  might	   some	   states	   be	   so	   powerfully	  motivated	   to	   use	   nuclear	  weapons	  that	  deterrence	  will	  fail?	  Many	  analysts	  would	  answer	  each	  of	  these	  questions	  with	  a	  simple	  “no.”	  	  According	  to	  an	   increasingly	  common	  view,	  states	  are	  unlikely	  to	  use	  nuclear	  weapons	  at	  all,	  highly	  unlikely	  to	  use	  them	  against	  other	  states	  that	  can	  retaliate	  in	  kind,	  and	  extremely	  unlikely	  to	  use	  them	  against	  the	  United	  States	  –	  the	  world’s	  preeminent	  military	  power.	   	  No	  other	  act	  seems	  as	  foolhardy.	  	  Although	  U.S.	  President	  Barack	  Obama	  pledged,	  in	  his	  “global	  zero”	  speech	  in	  Prague	  in	  2009,	  that	  “the	  United	  States	  will	  maintain	  a	  safe,	  secure	  and	  effective	  arsenal	  to	  deter	  any	  adversary,	  and	  guarantee	  that	  defense	  to	  our	  allies,”	  most	  analysts	  do	  not	  believe	  deterrence	  is	  a	  demanding	  mission	  –	  because	  the	  odds	  of	  an	  adversary	  nuclear	  attack	  seem	  vanishingly	  small.	  	  “To	  put	  an	  end	  to	  Cold	  War	  thinking,”	  President	  Obama	  also	  proclaimed,	  “we	  will	  reduce	  the	  role	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  in	  our	  national	  security	  strategy,	  and	  urge	  others	  to	  do	  the	  same.”1	  	  Those	  analysts	  who	  favor	  further	  deep	  cuts	  to	  the	  U.S.	  nuclear	  arsenal	  commonly	  make	  the	  point	  that	  such	  weapons	  are	  stale	   leftovers	  from	  the	  Cold	  War.	   	  According	  to	  this	  logic,	  nuclear	  deterrence	  is	  a	  “legacy”	  mission.	   	  Cold	  War	  era	  nuclear	  arsenals,	  strategies,	  war	  plans,	  alert	  postures,	  deterrence	  puzzles,	  and	  worst-­‐case	  scenario	  planning	  are	  relics	  of	  a	  bygone	  era.2	  Of	  course,	  even	  those	  analysts	  who	  are	  confident	  that	  U.S.	  adversaries	  will	  not	  use	  nuclear	   weapons	   against	   the	   United	   States	   or	   its	   allies	   tend	   to	   recognize	   an	   array	   of	  contemporary	  nuclear	  dangers.	  	  For	  instance,	  terrorists	  might	  acquire	  nuclear	  weapons	  or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  White	  House,	  Office	  of	  the	  Press	  Secretary,	  “Remarks	  by	  President	  Barack	  Obama,”	  Hradcany	  Square,	  Prague,	  Czech	  Republic,	  April	  5,	  2009.	  2	  Indeed,	  some	  scholars	  debate	  whether	  nuclear	  weapons	  were	  ever	  essential	  for	  deterring	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  For	   two	   examples	   of	   prominent	   scholars	  who	   argue	   that	   nuclear	  weapons	  were	   unnecessary	   to	   deter	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  during	  the	  Cold	  War,	  see	  John	  E.	  Mueller,	  Atomic	  Obsession:	  Nuclear	  Alarmism	  from	  Hiroshima	  to	  
Al-­‐Qaeda	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2009);	  and	  Richard	  Ned	  Lebow	  and	  Janice	  G.	  Stein,	  We	  All	  Lost	  the	  
Cold	  War	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1994).	  More	  broadly,	  many	  scholars	  and	  policy	  analysts	  argue	  that	  nuclear	  deterrence	  –	  whatever	  its	  role	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  –	  is	  either	  unnecessary	  today	  or	  a	  simple	  mission	  because	  intentional	  nuclear	  attack	  is	  so	  unlikely.	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materials;	   accidents	  may	   lead	   to	   unwanted	   detonations;	   or	   states	  may	   start	   inadvertent	  nuclear	   war.	   	   But	   none	   of	   those	   dangers	   can	   be	   effectively	   mitigated	   through	   nuclear	  deterrence	  strategies.	  	  Terrorist	  acquisition	  is	  so	  terrifying	  precisely	  because	  terrorists	  are	  difficult	   to	  deter.3	  	  Accidents	   cannot	  be	  prevented	   through	  deterrence.	  And	  deterrence	   is	  irrelevant	  to	  inadvertent	  war	  scenarios,	  which	  by	  definition	  do	  not	  result	  from	  deliberate	  decisions	   for	  war.	   	  The	   implication	   is	   that	   these	  nuclear	  dangers	  can	  only	  be	  mitigated	   if	  nuclear	   policy	   is	   focused,	   first	   and	   foremost,	   on	   the	   goals	   of	   non-­‐proliferation,	   de-­‐legitimization,	   and	   eventual	   abolition.	   	   Many	   in	   the	   U.S.	   national	   security	   community	  acknowledge	   that	   nuclear	   weapons	   continue	   to	   play	   a	   residual	   deterrent	   role	   but,	   they	  believe	   that	   deterrence	   is	   straightforward:	   deterring	   the	   deterrable	   is	   fairly	   simple,	   and	  deterring	  the	  real	  dangers	  (terrorism,	  accidents,	  and	  the	  unintended)	  is	  impossible.	  	  This	  is	  why,	   for	   a	   large	   and	   growing	   portion	   of	  mainstream	   analysts	   and	   policymakers,	   nuclear	  policy	  essentially	  boils	  down	  to	  the	  goals	  of	  non-­‐proliferation	  and	  disarmament.	  Unfortunately,	   the	   increasingly	   influential	   perspective	   in	   Washington	   and	   the	  broader	   analytical	   community	   rests	   on	   a	   weak	   understanding	   of	   the	   role	   that	   nuclear	  weapons	  played	  during	  the	  Cold	  War,	  and	  it	  therefore	  overlooks	  the	  strategic	  continuities	  between	   the	   Cold	  War	   and	   the	   present.	   	  When	   one	   examines	  why	   NATO	   once	   relied	   so	  heavily	  on	  nuclear	  weapons,	  the	  continuities	  between	  past	  and	  present	  become	  clear,	  and	  the	  policies	  of	  those	  countries	  that	  are	  “hold	  outs”	  against	  the	  global	  campaign	  for	  nuclear	  arms	  reductions	  begin	  to	  make	  sense.	  	  In	  fact,	  nuclear	  deterrence	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  central	  to	   the	   conduct	   of	   international	   politics,	   now	   and	   long	   into	   the	   future.	   	   Moreover,	   the	  likelihood	  of	  intentional	  nuclear	  attacks	  –	  even	  against	  the	  United	  States	  –	  is	  far	  higher	  than	  most	  scholars	  and	  analysts	  realize.	  	  In	  short,	  nuclear	  deterrence	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  quite	  difficult	  in	  the	  foreseeable	  future.	  This	  report	  argues	  that	  the	  U.S.	  policy	  community	  has	  given	  too	  little	  attention	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  intra-­‐war	  nuclear	  deterrence.	   	   	  Specifically,	  relatively	  weak	  but	  nuclear-­‐armed	  countries	   –	   including	   potential	   adversaries	   of	   the	   United	   States	   –	   will	   face	   intense	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Paul	  K.	  Davis	  and	  Brian	  Michael	   Jenkins,	  Deterrence	  and	  Influence	  in	  Counterterrorism:	  A	  Component	  in	  the	  
War	   on	   al-­‐Qaeda	   (Santa	   Monica,	   Calif.:	   RAND,	   2002),	   p.	   xviii.	   	   A	   new	   study	   suggests,	   however,	   that	   it	   is	  possible	   –	   indeed	   very	   likely	   –	   that	   the	   United	   States	   can	   deter	   states	   from	   giving	   nuclear	   weapon	   to	  terrorists.	   	   Keir	   A.	   Lieber	   and	   Daryl	   G.	   Press,	   “Why	   States	   Won’t	   Give	   Nuclear	   Weapons	   to	   Terrorists,”	  
International	  Security	  (Summer	  2013),	  forthcoming.	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pressures	   during	   conventional	   wars	   to	   use	   nuclear	   weapons	   coercively	   to	   create	   a	  stalemate	  and	  avoid	  a	  calamitous	  military	  defeat.	  	  The	  United	  States	  has	  little	  experience	  at	  deterring	  intra-­‐war	  nuclear	  escalation.4	  	  It	  has	  fought	  conventional	  wars	  against	  states	  with	  nuclear-­‐armed	  allies,	  but	  never	  directly	  against	  a	  nuclear-­‐armed	  adversary.	  	  That	  fact	  may	  soon	   change.	   	   Given	   the	   United	   States’	   global	   military	   commitments	   and	   the	   spread	   of	  nuclear	   weapons	   to	   potential	   U.S.	   adversaries,	   the	   United	   States	   could	   soon	   find	   itself	  engaged	  in	  conventional	  operations	  against	  a	  regional	  nuclear-­‐armed	  adversary.	  	  Regional	  adversaries	   cannot	   match	   U.S.	   conventional	   military	   power,	   and	   conventional	   defeat	   is	  often	  extraordinarily	   costly	   for	   adversary	   leaders	   and	   their	   regimes.	   	  Therefore,	   regional	  adversaries	   face	   powerful	   incentives	   to	   employ	   nuclear	  weapons	   coercively	   to	   stalemate	  the	  United	  States	  before	  suffering	  major	  battlefield	  defeats	  and	  the	  attendant	  catastrophic	  consequences.	  This	   report	   makes	   four	   principal	   arguments:	   	   First,	   nuclear	   weapons	   are	   just	   as	  salient	   today	   as	   they	   were	   in	   the	   past.	   	   During	   the	   Cold	   War,	   nuclear	   weapons	   were	  enormously	  valuable	  because	  one	  set	  of	  countries	  (members	  of	   the	  North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organization,	   or	  NATO)	   lacked	   the	   conventional	  military	  power	   to	  defend	   itself	   from	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  its	  Warsaw	  Pact	  allies.	  	  Nuclear	  weapons	  allowed	  the	  “weak”	  side	  to	  deter	  the	  “strong”	  one.5	  	  And	  had	  war	  erupted,	  nuclear	  weapons	  would	  have	  given	  the	  weak	  side	  its	   best	   hope	   of	   fighting	   the	   strong	   side	   to	   a	   stalemate.6	  	   The	   Cold	  War	   is	   over,	   but	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  The	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Defense’s	  2006	  Deterrence	  Operations	  Joint	  Operating	  Concept	  (DO	  JOC)	  holds	  that	  deterrence	  “is	  achieved	  by	  credibly	  threatening	  to	  deny	  benefits	  and/or	  impose	  costs	  while…	  convincing	  the	  actor	  that	  restraint	  will	  result	  in	  an	  acceptable	  outcome.”	  	  In	  many	  potential	  conflicts,	  however,	  the	  nature	  of	  U.S.	   desired	   end-­‐states,	   the	   fragility	   of	   adversary	   regimes,	   the	   proximity	   of	   an	   adversary’s	   conventional	  weapons	   and	   strategic	   systems,	   and	   the	   nature	   of	   U.S.	   military	   doctrine	   (which	   is	   designed	   to	   deny	   the	  adversary	  situational	  awareness)	  will	  make	   it	  difficult	   to	  assure	  adversaries	   that	   their	  restraint	  will	   lead	  to	  “acceptable	  outcomes.”	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  deny	  adversaries	  the	  benefits	  of	  nuclear	  escalation	  or	   credibly	   threaten	   to	   impose	   adequate	   costs.	   	   In	   short,	   intra-­‐war	   deterrence	   will	   likely	   pose	   daunting	  challenges	  for	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  partners	  in	  the	  coming	  years.	  5	  In	  this	  report,	  “weak”	  refers	  to	  the	  country	  (or	  alliance)	  that	  lacks	  the	  conventional	  military	  power	  to	  prevail	  in	  a	  conventional	  war	  against	  its	  key	  enemies;	  “strong”	  refers	  to	  a	  country	  that	  is	  likely	  to	  win	  a	  conventional	  conflict.	  	  Used	  in	  this	  fashion,	  weak	  and	  strong	  are	  dyadic	  features	  –	  i.e.,	  they	  refer	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  two	   states	   (or	   groups	   of	   states)	   rather	   than	   to	   underlying	   features	   of	   the	   states	   themselves.	   	   Using	   this	  formulation,	  because	  NATO	  declined	  to	  spend	  sufficiently	  on	  defense	  to	  create	  a	  robust	  conventional	  defense,	  which	  could	  be	  expected	  to	  reliably	  defeat	  a	  major	  Warsaw	  Pact	  attack,	  it	  required	  nuclear	  weapons	  to	  create	  stalemate	  and	  effective	  deterrence.	  6	  Note	  that	  the	  conventional	  military	  balance	  in	  Europe	  was	  not	  as	  one-­‐sided	  as	  was	  often	  portrayed.	  But	  even	  in	   the	   late-­‐1980s,	  at	   the	  height	  of	  NATO’s	  conventional	  military	  might,	   the	  NATO-­‐Pact	  military	  balance	  was	  merely	   competitive	   –	  meaning	   that	   either	   side	  might	   have	   prevailed	   in	   a	   conventional	   conflict.	   There	  was	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underlying	  conditions	  that	  made	  nuclear	  weapons	  vital	  then	  still	  exist	  today.	   	  All	  that	  has	  changed	  are	  the	  seats	  at	  the	  table.	  	  In	  the	  past	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  allies	  felt	  weak,	  and	  not	  surprisingly	  they	  tightly	  gripped	  their	  nuclear	  weapons.	  	  Today,	  most	  of	  those	  countries	  feel	  strong,	  and	  –	  not	  surprisingly	  –	  nuclear	  weapons	  suddenly	  seem	  anachronistic	  to	  them.	  	  But	   the	  end	  of	   the	  Cold	  War	  did	  not	  make	  every	  country	  safe;	   in	   fact,	  many	  of	  America’s	  potential	  adversaries	  face	  the	  same	  overarching	  problem	  today	  that	  NATO	  faced	  during	  the	  Cold	   War:	   how	   to	   deter	   and	   if	   necessary	   stalemate	   an	   adversary	   that	   possesses	  overwhelming	   conventional	  military	  power.	   	   The	  platitude	   that	  nuclear	  weapons	   are	  not	  well	  suited	  to	  the	  security	  threats	  of	  the	  21st	  century	  is	  incorrect;	  it	  is	  more	  accurate	  to	  say	  that	  they	  are	  not	  well	  suited	  to	  the	  security	  problems	  that	  confront	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  21st	  century.	  	  But	  for	  those	  who	  fear	  U.S.	  military	  might	  –	  or	  who	  fear	  other	  strong	  states	  –	  nuclear	  weapons	  are	  as	  helpful	  as	  they	  were	  for	  NATO	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.7	  Second,	  weak	   states	   face	   powerful	   incentives	   to	  use	   nuclear	  weapons	   if	   they	   find	  themselves	  in	  a	  conventional	  war	  against	  a	  much	  stronger	  adversary.	  	  Scholars	  and	  policy	  analysts	   who	   study	   deterrence	   often	   claim	   that	   no	   rational	   leader	   would	   use	   nuclear	  weapons	   against	   a	   country	   that	   could	   respond	   in	   kind	   –	   let	   alone	   a	   country	   that	   could	  respond	  with	  far	  greater	  force.	  	  But	  this	  is	  incorrect.	  	  Analysts	  who	  make	  this	  claim	  conflate	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  never	  a	   time	   in	  which	  NATO	  could	  have	  confidently	  relied	  upon	  conventional	   forces	   to	  defeat	  a	  major	  Pact	  offensive.	   	  For	  critiques	  of	  the	  excessive	  pessimism	  about	  the	  conventional	  military	  balance	  during	  the	  Cold	  War,	   see	  Alain	  C.	   Enthoven	   and	  K.	  Wayne	   Smith,	  How	  Much	   is	  Enough?	  Shaping	  the	  Defense	  Program	  1961-­‐
1969	  (Santa	  Monica,	  CA:	  RAND	  Corporation,	  1971);	  John	  J.	  Mearsheimer,	  “Why	  the	  Soviets	  Can’t	  Win	  Quickly	  in	   Central	   Europe,”	   International	   Security,	   Vol.	   7,	   No.	   1	   (Summer	   1982);	   Barry	   R.	   Posen,	   “Measuring	   the	  European	  Conventional	  Balance:	  Coping	  with	  Complexity	  in	  Threat	  Assessment,”	  International	  Security,	  Vol.	  9,	  No.	  3	  (Winter	  1984-­‐85),	  47-­‐88.	  7	  The	  seminal	  work	  on	  the	   links	  between	  conventional	  operations	  and	  nuclear	  escalation	   is	  Barry	  R.	  Posen,	  
Inadvertent	  Escalation:	  Conventional	  War	  and	  Nuclear	  Risks	  (Ithaca,	  NY:	  Cornell,	  1991).	  	  Writing	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  Posen	  notes	  that	  “the	  most	  common	  view	  of	  how	  a	  conventional	  war	  could	  become	  a	  nuclear	  war”	   focuses	   on	   the	   danger	   that	   “had	  NATO	   found	   itself	   losing	   a	   conventional	   ground	  battle	   for	   control	   of	  Western	  Europe…	   the	  United	   States	  might	   have	   reached	   for	   nuclear	  weapons	   in	   the	   hopes	   of	   salvaging	   its	  position”	  (p.	  1).	  But	  two	  decades	  later,	  the	  common	  understanding	  of	  the	  incentives	  of	  the	  “weak”	  (i.e.,	  those	  who	  stand	  to	   lose	  the	  conventional	  war)	  has	  evaporated.	   	  Few	  national	  security	  experts	  –	  and	  it	  seems	  few	  deterrence	  experts	  –	  still	  remember	  that	   it	  was	  NATO’s	  strategy	  to	  escalate	  rather	  than	  lose	  a	  conventional	  war.	   	   Fewer	   still	   have	   sought	   to	   identify	   the	   underlying	   strategic	   conditions	   from	   the	   Cold	  War	   that	  made	  intentional	  nuclear	  escalation	  by	  NATO	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  reasonable	  strategy.	  	  And	  fewer	  still	  have	  examined	  the	  current	   strategic	   environment	   to	   see	   if	   those	   strategic	   conditions	   still	   exist	   today.	   	   We	   seek	   to	   remind	  scholars,	  analysts,	  military	  planners,	  and	  national	  leaders	  of	  what	  was	  once	  a	  common	  view;	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  underlying	  conditions	  and	  logic	  which	   led	  NATO	  to	  plan	  to	  use	  nuclear	  weapons	  against	  the	  Soviet	  Union	   still	   exist	   elsewhere	   today.	   	  The	   same	   logic	   that	  once	  would	  have	   led	  NATO	   to	  use	  nuclear	  weapons	  against	   the	  Warsaw	  Pact	  may	   pressure	  North	   Korea,	   Pakistan,	   China,	   Russia,	   or	   others	   to	   deliberately	   use	  nuclear	  weapons	  today.	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the	   logic	   of	   peacetime	   deterrence	  with	   the	   logic	   of	   war.	   	   Leaders	   facing	   the	   prospect	   of	  imminent	  defeat	  have	  compelling	  reasons	  to	  escalate	  coercively	  –	  with	  nuclear	  weapons	  –	  to	   bring	   about	   a	   ceasefire.	   	   Coercive	   nuclear	   escalation	   by	   the	   weaker	   side	   forces	   the	  stronger	  side	  to	  choose	  among	  several	  options	  –	  all	  of	  which	  are	  grim.	  	  It	  is	  because	  all	  of	  those	   options	   are	   unattractive	   that	   an	   adversary	  will	   be	   tempted	   to	   escalate	   in	   the	   first	  place.	   	   Viewed	   through	   this	   lens,	   Pakistan	   may	   have	   powerful,	   rational	   reasons	   to	   use	  nuclear	   weapons	   if	   it	   is	   losing	   a	   conventional	   war	   to	   India;	   North	   Korea	   has	   powerful	  reasons	  to	  use	  nuclear	  weapons	  coercively,	  rather	  than	  permit	   its	  enemies	  to	  prevail	   in	  a	  war.	   	  And	  Chinese	  leaders	  would	  face	  some	  of	  these	  same	  incentives	  if	  their	  armed	  forces	  were	  suffering	  a	  humiliating	  defeat	  in	  a	  war	  in	  maritime	  East	  Asia.	  	  In	  short,	  an	  escalatory	  strategy	  is	  cold-­‐blooded,	  but	  not	  far-­‐fetched	  –	  indeed,	  it	  was	  NATO’s	  policy	  for	  nearly	  thirty	  years.8	  Third,	   this	   report	   shows	   that	   the	   logic	   of	   coercive	   nuclear	   escalation	   is	   well	  understood	  by	  countries	  around	  the	  world.	  	  Coercive	  nuclear	  escalation	  is	  not	  a	  theoretical	  possibility;	  it	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  defense	  plans	  and	  nuclear	  employment	  doctrines	  of	  several	  nuclear-­‐armed	  states.	  	  We	  identify	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  states	  would	  be	  most	  likely	  to	   build	   defense	   plans	   around	   doctrines	   of	   coercive	   nuclear	   escalation;	   we	   then	   sort	  nuclear-­‐armed	  countries	  according	  to	  those	  conditions;	   finally,	  we	  show	  that	  those	  states	  that	   should	   have	   adopted	   coercive	   nuclear	   doctrines	   (according	   to	   our	   argument)	   have	  actually	  done	  so.	  Fourth,	   this	   report	   identifies	   global	   “hotspots”	   where	   plausible	   conventional	  conflicts	   are	   most	   likely	   to	   trigger	   dangerous	   escalatory	   dynamics.	   	   We	   posit	   a	   set	   of	  exacerbating	   conditions	   –	   including	   the	   prospect	   of	   conquest,	   regime	   change,	   and	   the	  escalatory	   nature	   of	   certain	   military	   operations	   –	   which	   make	   escalation	   during	  conventional	  war	  more	  likely,	  and	  then	  we	  use	  those	  conditions	  to	  distinguish	  the	  hotspots	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  A	  policy	  of	  coercive	  nuclear	  escalation	  –	  to	  create	  stalemate	  during	  an	  unwinnable	  conventional	  war	  –	  was	  NATO’s	  policy	   from	  the	  mid-­‐1960s	   through	   the	  end	  of	   the	  Cold	  War.	   	  Prior	   to	   the	  1960s,	  NATO	  believed	   it	  could	  win	  a	  nuclear	  war,	  and	  so	   it	  had	  a	  different	  nuclear	  doctrine:	   immediate	  escalation	  of	  a	  conventional	  conflict,	  not	  to	  coerce,	  but	  rather	  to	  destroy	  the	  enemy’s	  nuclear	  force	  and	  win.	  	  For	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  the	   evolution	   in	   U.S.	   and	   NATO	   war	   plans,	   see	   Keir	   A.	   Lieber	   and	   Daryl	   G.	   Press,	   Nuclear	   Weapons	   and	  
International	  Politics	  (unpublished	  book	  manuscript),	  chapter	  4.	  	  See	  also	  Gregory	  Pedlow,	  “The	  Evolution	  of	  NATO	  Strategy,	  1949-­‐69,”	  in	  Gregory	  W.	  Pedlow,	  ed.,	  NATO	  Strategy	  Documents,	  1949-­‐69,	  and	  accompanying	  documents,	  available	  online	  at	  http://www.nato.int/archives/strategy.htm.	  
	   	   	  	  
	  
12	  
which	  pose	  high	  risks	  of	  escalation	  from	  those	  that	  pose	  lower	  levels	  of	  risk.	  	  We	  find	  that	  most	  of	  the	  world’s	  most	  dangerous	  conflicts	  –	  i.e.,	  those	  that	  create	  the	  greatest	  incentives	  for	   combatants	   to	  use	  nuclear	  weapons	   –involve	   the	  United	   States:	   including	  war	  on	   the	  Korean	  Peninsula,	   conflicts	   in	  maritime	  East	  Asia,	  and	  (in	   the	   future)	  war	   in	   the	  Strait	  of	  Hormuz.	   	   To	   be	   sure,	   an	   India-­‐Pakistan	   conflict	   would	   trigger	   dangerous	   escalatory	  dynamics,	   but	   a	   South	   Asian	   conflict	   –	   which	   has	   appropriately	   attracted	   considerable	  attention	   because	   of	   the	   grave	   risks	   of	   escalation	   –	   appears	   no	  more	   dangerous	   (and,	   in	  fact,	  may	  be	  less	  combustible)	  than	  several	  quite	  plausible	  future	  U.S.	  wars	  .	  Why	  do	  so	  many	  other	  analysts	  reach	  a	  different	  conclusion	  about	  the	  likelihood	  of	  deliberate	  nuclear	  escalation?	  	  One	  possibility	  is	  that	  scholars	  and	  other	  analysts	  typically	  think	   about	   peacetime	   nuclear	   deterrence	   (preventing	   a	   surprise	   nuclear	   attack),	   rather	  than	   wartime	   deterrence	   (deterring	   nuclear	   escalation	   during	   conventional	   wars),	   the	  exception	  being	  the	  extensive	  literature	  on	  escalation	  risks	  during	  an	  India-­‐Pakistan	  war.9	  	  But	  surprisingly,	  even	  scholars	  who	  understand	  the	  difficulty	  of	  deterring	  escalation	  during	  a	  conventional	  war	  when	  applied	  to	  South	  Asian	  security	  dynamics,	  argue	  elsewhere	  that	  rational	   leaders	   would	   never	   use	   nuclear	   weapons	   against	   the	   United	   States.10	  	   But	   if	  analysts	   believe	   that	   Pakistan	   (the	   weak)	   could	   use	   nuclear	   weapons	   to	   prevent	  conventional	  defeat	  (even	  though	  Pakistan	  cannot	  win	  a	  nuclear	  war),	  why	  would	  the	  same	  analysts	  dismiss	   the	  possibility	   that	  North	  Korea,	  or	   in	   the	   future	   Iran,	  or	  possibly	  China,	  would	  use	  nuclear	  weapons	  in	  an	  escalatory	  fashion	  against	  a	  strong	  nemesis?	  However	  one	  explains	  this	  apparent	  contradiction,	  the	  bottom	  line	  is	  that	  the	  same	  fears	  that	  made	  vulnerable	  and	  fearful	  countries	  cling	  to	  nuclear	  weapons	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  will	   make	   those	   weapons	   essential	   to	   the	   weak	   and	   vulnerable	   in	   the	   coming	   decades.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  For	   example,	   see	   Sumit	   Ganguly	   and	   Devin	   T.	   Hagerty,	   Fearful	   Symmetry:	   India-­‐Pakistan	   Crises	   In	   The	  
Shadow	  Of	  Nuclear	  Weapons	  (New	  Delhi:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2005);	  S.	  Paul	  Kapur,	  “India	  and	  Pakistan's	  Unstable	  Peace:	  Why	  Nuclear	  South	  Asia	  Is	  Not	  Like	  Cold	  War	  Europe,”	  International	  Security,	  Vol.	  30,	  No.	  2	  (Fall	   2005),	   pp.	   127-­‐152;	   and	   V.	   R.	   Raghavan,	   “Limited	   War	   and	   Nuclear	   Escalation	   in	   South	   Asia,”	  
Nonproliferation	  Review,	  Vol.	  8,	  No.	  3	  (2001),	  pp.	  82-­‐98.	  10	  At	  a	  recent	  presentation	  to	  U.S.	  national	  security	  analysts	  and	  mid-­‐level	  U.S.	  government	  national	  security	  officials,	  we	  asked,	  “How	  many	  of	  you	  believe	  a	  state	  will	  deliberately	  use	  nuclear	  weapons	  against	  the	  United	  States	   within	   20	   years?”	   	   No	   one	   raised	   a	   hand.	   	  We	   then	   asked,	   “How	  many	   believe	   Pakistan	  would	   use	  nuclear	  weapons	  if	  it	  were	  losing	  a	  conventional	  war	  to	  India?”	  	  Roughly	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  the	  audience	  raised	  a	  hand.	   	  When	  we	  asked	  why	  North	  Korea	  would	  not	   face	  the	  same	  incentives	  as	  Pakistan,	  no	  one	  offered	  an	  explanation,	  and	  several	  of	   the	  analysts	  admitted	  they	  had	  simply	  never	   thought	  about	   the	  problem	  in	   that	  way.	  	  Washington,	  D.C.,	  September	  2012.	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Nuclear	   weapons	   are	   the	   ultimate	   instruments	   of	   stalemate	   –	   they	   are	   the	   ultimate	  weapons	  of	  the	  weak.	  	  Viewed	  through	  this	  lens,	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  radically	  changed	  
who	  needed	  nuclear	  weapons,	  but	  did	  little	  to	  reduce	  the	  utility	  of	  the	  weapons.	  This	   report	   has	   five	  main	   sections.	   	   First,	   it	   explains	   the	   logic	   of	   coercive	   nuclear	  escalation	  –	  why	   the	  weak	  might	   feel	  compelled	   to	  escalate	  a	  conventional	  war,	  and	  why	  they	   might	   hope	   doing	   so	   would	   grant	   them	   the	   ceasefire	   they	   desire.	   	   Second,	   we	  demonstrate	   the	   rationality	   of	   that	   logic	   by	   examining	   the	   options	   available	   to	   a	   state	  seeking	  to	  respond	  to	  coercive	  nuclear	  escalation.	  	  Third,	  we	  assess	  the	  nuclear	  doctrines	  of	  nuclear-­‐weapon	  states	  across	  four	  decades	  to	  determine	  if	  states	  actually	  act	  according	  to	  the	   logic	   developed	   in	   the	   preceding	   sections.	   	   Fourth,	   we	   identify	   the	   most	   dangerous	  global	  hotspots	  based	  on	  their	  coercive	  nuclear	  escalatory	  potential.	  	  Finally,	  we	  discuss	  the	  policy	  implications	  of	  our	  analysis.	  
THE	  LOGIC	  OF	  COERCIVE	  NUCLEAR	  ESCALATION	  The	   core	   national	   security	   problem	   for	   many	   militarily	   weak	   countries	   is	  straightforward:	  how	  to	  keep	  powerful	  enemies	  at	  bay.	  	  For	  weak	  countries,	  military	  defeat	  can	  be	  disastrous.	   In	  some	  circumstances,	  battlefield	   losses	  are	  followed	  by	  conquest	  and	  harsh	  treatment	  of	  the	  defeated	  society:	  e.g.,	  a	  brutal	  occupation,	  the	  loss	  of	  sovereignty,	  or	  in	  rare	  cases	  genocide.	  	  But	  even	  when	  those	  terrible	  outcomes	  are	  not	  likely,	  war	  is	  often	  disastrous	  for	  the	   leaders	  of	  the	  defeated.	   	  Military	  planners	   in	  weak	  states	  –	  particularly	  those	  with	  adversarial	  relations	  with	  the	  United	  States	  (which	  has	  easily	  vanquished	  a	  half-­‐dozen	  military	   opponents	   since	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Cold	  War)11	  –	  must,	   therefore,	   address	   a	  fundamental	   question:	   if	   war	   occurs,	   and	   conventional	   victory	   is	   impossible,	   what	  strategies	  might	  create	  a	  stalemate	  and	  avoid	  catastrophic	  defeat?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Since	  1989,	  U.S.	  military	  forces,	  supported	  in	  some	  cases	  by	  a	  coalition	  of	  allies,	  defeated	  the	  military	  forces	  of	   the	   following	   states	   with	   minimal	   U.S.	   losses:	   Panama	   (1989),	   Iraq	   (1991),	   Serbia	   (1999),	   Afghanistan	  (2001),	   and	   Iraq	   again	   (2003),	   and	   the	   U.S.	   provided	   support	   to	   the	   operation	   that	   overthrew	   the	   Libyan	  government	  (2011).	  	  Although	  the	  U.S.	  military	  has	  had	  considerable	  difficulty	  defeating	  insurgents,	  from	  the	  perspective	   of	   weak	   governments,	   the	   hope	   that	   after	   one’s	   defeat	   and	   arrest	   (or	   execution)	   rebels	   will	  frustrate	  the	  enemy	  is	  likely	  cold	  comfort.	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Escalation	  and	  the	  Fate	  of	  Enemy	  Leaders	  	   Although	  the	  United	  States	  has	  a	   long	  history	  of	   treating	  defeated	  enemy	  societies	  well	   –	   e.g.,	   in	   Germany,	   Japan,	   and	   more	   recently	   Iraq	   –	   the	   leaders	   of	   countries	   that	  recently	  fought	  the	  United	  States	  have	  suffered	  severe	  consequences.	   	  In	  1989,	  the	  United	  States	   conquered	  Panama	  and	  arrested	   its	   leader,	  Manuel	  Noriega.	   	   For	  most	  Americans,	  this	   short	  war	   is	   forgotten.	   For	  Noriega,	   it	   triggered	   a	   calamitous	   reversal	   of	   fortune:	   he	  exchanged	   a	   life	   of	   power	   and	   riches	   for	   twenty-­‐three	   years	   in	   prison	   –	   and	   counting.	  	  Saddam	  Hussein	   suffered	   a	  worse	   fate;	   he	   lost	   power,	   he	  was	   humiliated,	   his	   sons	  were	  killed,	   and	   he	  was	   hanged	   in	   front	   of	   jeering	   enemies.	   	  Muammar	  Qaddafi	   spent	   his	   last	  days	  hiding	  from	  U.S.-­‐supported	  rebels	  before	  being	  caught	  cowering	  in	  a	  culvert.	  	  He	  was	  then	  beaten	   and	   shot	   to	   death.	   	  Dozens	   of	  Qaddafi	   loyalists,	   including	   his	   son,	  were	   also	  rounded	  up	  and	  executed.	  	  	  Even	   leaders	   whose	   countries	   were	   never	   conquered	   –	   those	   that	   suffered	   only	  	  “limited”	  defeats	  –	  often	  paid	  a	  high	  price.	  	  Bosnian	  Serb	  leaders	  Karadžić	  and	  Ratko	  Mladić	  are	  still	  in	  prison	  in	  the	  Hague,	  where	  Serbia’s	  former	  leader,	  Milošević,	  died	  in	  detention.12	  	  	  More	  broadly,	  studies	  demonstrate	  that	  leaders	  have	  a	  powerful,	  personal	  incentive	  to	   force	   a	   stalemate	   on	   the	   battlefield	   rather	   than	   accept	   defeat.	   	   One	   study	   used	   data	  covering	  more	  than	  80	  years	  of	  leadership	  changes	  around	  the	  world	  and	  found	  that	  those	  leaders	  who	  achieved	  a	  stalemate	  in	  a	  war	  were	  nearly	  twice	  as	  likely	  to	  remain	  in	  power	  as	   those	   countries	   that	   suffered	   military	   defeat.	   	   Even	   more	   tellingly,	   the	   leaders	   of	  countries	  who	  lost	  were	  approximately	  four	  times	  as	  likely	  to	  be	  punished	  –	  exiled,	   jailed,	  or	  killed	  –	  as	  those	  who	  managed	  to	  achieve	  stalemate.13	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Randal	  C.	  Archibald,	  “Noriega	  Is	  Sent	  to	  Prison	  Back	  in	  Panama,	  Where	  the	  Terror	  Has	  Turned	  to	  Shrugs,”	  
New	   York	   Times,	   December	   11,	   2011;	   Marlise	   Simmons,	   “Former	   Bosnian	   Leader	   Begins	   His	   Defense	   at	  Genocide	  Trial,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  16	  October	  2012;	  Simmons,	  “The	  Hague:	  Mladic’s	  Trial	  Resumes,”	  New	  York	  
Times,	  9	  July	  2012;	  Simmons	  and	  Alison	  Smale,	  “Slobodan	  Milosevic,	  64,	  Former	  Yugoslav	  Leader	  Accused	  of	  War	  Crimes,	  Dies,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  12	  March	  2006.	  13	  Giacomo	  Chiozza	  and	  H.E.	  Goemans,	  Leaders	  and	  International	  Conflict	  (Cambridge:	  Cambrudge	  University,	  2011).	  	  The	  odds	  of	  a	  leader	  remaining	  in	  office	  for	  1	  year	  after	  suffering	  a	  military	  defeat	  was	  51%,	  compared	  to	  89%	  for	  a	  leader	  whose	  state	  fought	  to	  a	  draw.	  	  The	  percentage	  of	  leaders	  who	  remained	  in	  office	  for	  four	  years	  was	  24%	  for	  “losers”	  and	  42%	  for	  those	  who	  stalemated.	  	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  four	  years,	  47%	  of	  leaders	  whose	  country	  lost	  wars	  were	  “punished”	  –	  exiled,	  jailed,	  or	  killed	  –	  while	  only	  13%	  of	  those	  who	  achieved	  a	  “draw.”	  	  These	  caluculations	  are	  based	  on	  the	  data	  in	  Chiozza	  and	  Goemans,	  pp.	  56-­‐57.	  	  For	  more	  on	  leaders	  and	  war	   outcomes,	   see	   Alexandre	   Debs	   and	  H.	   E.	   Goemans,	   “Regime	   Type,	   the	   Fate	   of	   Leaders,	   and	  War,”	  
American	  Political	  Science	  Review,	  Vol.	  104,	  No.	  3	  (August	  2010):	  430-­‐45.	  	  See	  also,	  Giacomo	  Chiozza	  and	  H.	  E.	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Not	  only	  do	   leaders	   face	  great	  pressure	   to	  create	  battlefield	  stalemate	  before	   they	  suffer	   irredeemable	   losses,	   they	  must	   do	   so	   quickly.	   	   A	   limited	   conventional	   defeat	   that	  “merely”	   destroys	   a	   large	   fraction	   of	   a	   country’s	   military,	   or	   substantially	   degrades	   the	  institutions	  that	  ensure	  “government	  control”	  (for	  example,	  the	  leadership’s	  security	  force,	  domestic	  intelligence	  services,	  internal	  security	  troops,	  and	  party	  militias),	  could	  trigger	  a	  wartime	  or	  post-­‐war	  coup.	  	  Even	  if	  the	  military	  and	  security	  services	  remain	  loyal,	  the	  war	  must	  end	  before	   they	  are	   too	  degraded	   to	  suppress	  uprisings	   in	   the	  wake	  of	   the	  conflict.	  	  Furthermore,	   military	   operations	   –	   especially	   those	   conducted	   by	   the	   United	   States	   –	  Increasingly	   involve	   intense	   campaigns	   against	   enemy	   command	   bunkers	   and	   other	  leadership	   sites,	   posing	   direct,	   daily	   threats	   to	   the	   leaders,	   their	   key	   political	   allies,	   and	  their	   families.14	  	   Leaders	   who	   see	   their	   military	   being	   destroyed,	   their	   security	   services	  being	  savaged,	  and	  who	  have	  bombs	  raining	  down	  upon	  their	  command	  bunkers,	  may	  feel	  great	  pressure	  to	  halt	  the	  war	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.	  	  In	  short,	  losing	  wars	  is	  often	  a	  terrible	  outcome.	  	  Sometimes	  it	  results	  in	  horrendous	  consequences	   for	   the	   defeated	   society.	   	   In	   the	   early	   decades	   of	   the	   Cold	   War,	   West	  Europeans	  were	  understandably	  horrified	  by	  the	  notion	  of	  being	  conquered	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  losing	  their	  democratic	  institutions,	  and	  living	  under	  a	  murderous	  Stalinist	  tyranny.	  	  Today,	  many	   Israelis	  believe	   that	  a	  military	  defeat	  at	   the	  hands	  of	   their	  neighbors	  would	  usher	  in	  another	  tragic	  era	  in	  Jewish	  history	  –	  including	  genocide	  and	  ethnic	  cleansing.	  	  But	  even	  when	  the	  outcomes	  of	  war	  are	  unlikely	  to	  lead	  to	  mass	  societal	  suffering	  among	  the	  defeated,	   enemy	   leaders	   (not	   just	   the	   supreme	   leader,	   but	   ruling	   party	   officials,	  military	  officers,	  and	  members	  of	  the	  domestic	  security	  services)	  rightly	  fear	  the	  consequences.	  	  The	   critical	   message	   is	   this:	   America’s	   recent	   conflicts	   are	   considered	   “regional	  wars”	   in	  Washington;	   for	  adversaries	   there	   is	  nothing	  “regional”	  or	  “limited”	  about	   them.	  	  For	  the	  weak,	  these	  are	  existential	  struggles.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Goemans,	   “International	   Conflict	   and	   the	   Tenure	   of	   Leaders:	   Is	   War	   Still	   ‘Ex	   Post’	   Inefficient?”	   American	  
Journal	  of	  Political	  Science,	  Vol.	  48,	  No.	  3	  (July	  2004):	  604-­‐19.	  14	  In	  the	  1991	  Persian	  Gulf	  War,	  the	  United	  States	  conducted	  203	  airstrikes	  on	  “government	  control”	  targets.	  	  That	  effort	  intensified	  in	  the	  2003	  war:	  U.S.	  aircraft	  struck	  1,799	  aim	  points	  in	  the	  “SR”	  target	  set,	  i.e.,	  targets	  associated	   with	   regime	   survival	   and	   political	   control	   over	   the	   military.	   	   An	   additional	   50	   strikes	   were	  conducted	  against	   time	  sensitive	   leadership	   targets	   (i.e.,	   efforts	   to	   target	  Saddam	  Hussein	  and	  other	  senior	  members	  of	  the	  government).	  	  See	  Gulf	  War	  Air	  Power	  Survey	  (GWAPS),	  V.	  5,	  U.S.	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  Washington,	   D.C.,	   1993;	   Table	   177;	   and	   on	   the	   2003	   war,	   “Operation	   Iraqi	   Freedom	   –	   By	   the	   Numbers,”	  Assessment	  and	  Analysis	  Division,	  USCENTAF,	  20	  April	  2003,	  pp.	  4,	  5,	  and	  9.	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Escalation	  and	  the	  Role	  of	  Nuclear	  Weapons	  The	   leaders	  of	  weak	  states	   face	   life-­‐and-­‐death	   incentives	   to	  quickly	  halt	  wars	   that	  are	  going	  badly	  for	  them.	  	  But	  why	  are	  nuclear	  weapons	  needed	  for	  this	  mission?	  	  Several	  attributes	   of	   nuclear	   weapons	   make	   them	   uniquely	   useful	   for	   stalemating	   a	   stronger	  enemy.	   	   Nuclear	  weapons	   are	   small	   and	   hence	   relatively	   easy	   to	   hide	   –	   enhancing	   their	  chance	   of	   surviving	   the	   early	   stages	   of	   a	   conflict.15	  	   Furthermore,	   not	   many	   nuclear	  weapons	  need	  to	  survive:	  each	  bomb	  is	  so	  destructive	  that	  an	  adversary	  who	  can	  credibly	  threaten	  to	  deliver	  even	  a	  few	  weapons	  against	  its	  enemy’s	  cities	  would	  possess	  a	  powerful	  coercive	   tool.16	  	   Finally,	  modern	   delivery	   systems	   –	   particularly	   ballistic	  missiles	   –	   allow	  states	  to	  deliver	  nuclear	  weapons	  to	  their	  target,	  even	  if	  its	  enemy	  controls	  the	  ground,	  air,	  and	  sea.	   	   In	  contrast,	  most	  conventional	  weapons	  become	  progressively	  harder	  to	  deliver	  against	  enemy	  cities	  as	  the	  enemy	  gains	  the	  upper	  hand	  militarily,	  and	  they	  inflict	  too	  little	  damage	  to	  shock	  the	  winning	  side	  into	  submitting	  to	  stalemate.	  Taken	  together,	  these	  three	  characteristics	  mean	   that	   even	  a	   state	  on	   the	  verge	  of	  being	  vanquished	   can	   conceivably	  destroy	  the	  potential	  victor.	  	  The	  implication:	  nuclear	  weapons	  are	  the	  ultimate	  weapon	  of	  the	  weak.	  Not	  only	  are	  nuclear	  weapons	  better	  suited	  for	  wartime	  coercion	  than	  conventional	  alternatives,	   there	   are	   three	   other	   considerations	   that	   make	   more	   useful	   than	   other	  weapons	  that	  analysts	  worry	  may	  spread	  in	  the	  21st	  century,	  including	  cyber,	  chemical,	  and	  biological	  weapons.	  	  First,	   although	   popular	   culture	   frequently	   portrays	   nuclear	   weapons	   as	  uncontrollably	  destructive,	  their	  effects	  can	  be	  surprisingly	  calibrated.	  	  Weapons	  designers	  have	  created	  nuclear	  weapons	  with	  widely	  varying	  “yields,”	  allowing	  mission	  planners	   to	  tailor	  a	  strike	  to	  create	  a	  huge	  area	  of	  destruction	  or	  very	  little	  –	  whichever	  is	  desired.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  largest	  yield	  weapon	  in	  the	  current	  U.S.	  arsenal	  releases	  up	  to	  1,200	  kilotons	  of	  energy	   (80	  Hiroshimas);	   the	   smallest	  U.S.	  nuclear	  weapon	  can	  be	  set	   to	  detonate	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  A	  weapon	  cannot	  be	  a	  good	   tool	   for	   creating	   stalemate	  during	  a	   losing	  war	   if	   it	   is	   likely	   to	  be	  destroyed	  before	   it	   becomes	   clear	   that	   the	   war	   is	   going	   badly.	   	   In	   later	   sections	   of	   this	   paper	   we	   consider	   various	  adversary	   escalatory	   strategies,	   and	   the	   trade-­‐offs	   U.S.	   adversaries	   may	   face	   between	   early-­‐	   and	   late-­‐employment	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  during	  a	  conventional	  war.	  16	  These	  first	  two	  points	  interact:	  because	  each	  weapon	  is	  so	  destructive,	  a	  counterforce	  strike	  would	  need	  to	  destroy	   nearly	   every	   deliverable	   weapon	   to	   meaningfully	   limit	   damage,	   but	   that	   level	   of	   success	   is	  particularly	  difficult	  given	  that	  they	  are	  relatively	  easy	  to	  hide.	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only	  roughly	  0.3	  kilotons	  of	  explosive	  power	  (2%	  of	   the	  Hiroshima	  bomb).17	  	  The	   former	  would	   create	   250	   times	   the	   destruction	   as	   the	   latter.18	  	   Furthermore,	   by	   selecting	   the	  altitude	   of	   detonation,	   targeters	   can	   choose	   to	   create	   enormous	   amounts	   of	   radioactive	  fallout	  or	  virtually	  none.19	  And	  perhaps	  most	  importantly	  –	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  a	  weak	  state	   conducting	   a	   coercive	   campaign	   –	   nuclear	   weapons	   can	   be	   used	   either	   slowly	   or	  rapidly,	  or	  somewhere	  in	  between:	  they	  can	  be	  used	  to	  destroy	  one	  city	  today	  and	  another	  tomorrow,	  or	  one	  today	  and	  a	  dozen	  tomorrow.	  	  If	  fallout	  is	  avoided,	  damage	  can	  be	  meted	  out	   in	   distinct,	   painful	   episodes,	   facilitating	   coercion.	   	   In	   our	   popular	   culture,	   nuclear	  weapons	  are	  incredibly	  blunt	  tools.	  	  Some	  high-­‐yield	  weapons	  are.	  	  But	  compared	  to	  other	  instruments	   of	   coercion,	   nuclear	   weapons	   offer	   desperate	   weak-­‐state	   leaders	   tailored	  escalatory	  options.20	  Another	   criterion	   that	   makes	   nuclear	   weapons	   uniquely	   suitable	   for	   war-­‐ending	  coercion:	  the	  utility	  of	  nuclear	  strikes	  is	  not	  nullified	  by	  first	  use.21	  	  Once	  a	  cyber	  weapon	  is	  used,	   the	   victim	   (and	   others)	   can	   learn	   from	   the	   computer	   code	   and	   eliminate	   key	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  John	  Malik,	  The	  Yields	  of	  the	  Hiroshima	  and	  Nagasaki	  Explosions	  (Los	  Alamos	  National	  Laboratory	  Report	  LA-­‐8819),	  Los	  Alamos,	  NM,	  September	  1985;	  Hans	  M.	  Kristensen	  and	  Robert	  S.	  Norris,	  “U.S.	  Nuclear	  Forces,	  2013,”	  Bulletin	  of	  the	  Atomic	  Scientists,	  Vol.	  69,	  No.	  2	  (2013),	  pp.	  77-­‐86;	  and	  “The	  B83	  (Mk-­‐83)	  Bomb,”	  NuclearWeaponsArchive.org,	  November	  11,	  1997,	  available	  at	  http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Weapons/B83.html.	  18	  The	  high-­‐yield	  weapon	  in	  this	  example,	  the	  U.S.	  B83	  bomb,	  would	  produce	  destructive	  effects	  on	  the	  ground	  nearly	   sixteen	  times	   further	   than	   the	   lowest	   yield	  B61	  bomb,	   resulting	   in	   a	   destructive	   area	   on	   the	   ground	  more	   than	   250	   times	   greater.	   	   The	   seminal	   unclassified	  work	   on	   nuclear	   effects	   is,	   Samuel	   Glasstone	   and	  Phillip	  J.	  Dolan,	  The	  Effects	  of	  Nuclear	  Weapons	  (Washington,	  DC:	  U.S.	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1977).	  	  19	  Above	  a	  given	  “height	  of	  burst,”	  which	  is	  a	  function	  of	  warhead	  yield,	  there	  is	  vastly	  reduced	  local	  fallout.	  	  See	  Glasstone	  and	  Dolan,	  Effects	  of	  Nuclear	  Weapons,	  chap.	  9.	  	  For	  supporting	  calculations	  and	  some	  examples	  of	   the	   significance	   of	   no-­‐fallout	   airbursts,	   see	   Keir	   A.	   Lieber	   and	   Daryl	   G.	   Press,	   “The	   Nukes	   We	   Need:	  Preserving	   the	  American	  Deterrent,”	  Foreign	  Affairs,	   Vol.	   88,	  No.	   6	   (November/December	   2009);	   39-­‐51,	   as	  well	  as	  the	  technical	  appendix	  to	  that	  article,	  available	  at	  www.dartmouth.edu/~dpress.	  20	  The	  technical	  capabilities	  required	  to	  utilize	  nuclear	  weapons	  in	  a	  calibrated	  fashion,	  as	  described	  above,	  are	  simple	  for	  any	  state	  that	  can	  produce	  and	  deliver	  a	  nuclear	  weapon.	  	  Weapons	  with	  a	  yield	  in	  the	  single	  digits	  of	  kilotons	  –	  apparently	  like	  the	  devices	  tested	  by	  North	  Korea	  –	  are	  well	  suited	  to	  “minimal	  damage”	  attacks.	  	  And	  even	  a	  primitive	  20-­‐kiloton	  weapon,	  like	  the	  first	  U.S.	  atomic	  bombs,	  would	  be	  sufficient	  to	  cause	  massive	  destructive	  effects	  if	  desired.	  	  Controlling	  height	  of	  burst	  with	  sufficient	  accuracy	  to	  cause	  or	  prevent	  fallout	  merely	  requires	  simple	  altimeters,	  a	  technology	  that	  is	  easily	  available	  to	  any	  country	  capable	  of	  firing	  ballistic	  missiles.	  21	  Because	  the	  victim	  of	  a	  nuclear	  strike	  cannot	  easily	  take	  steps	  to	  inoculate	  itself	  from	  subsequent	  attacks,	  a	  state	  using	  the	  weapons	  coercively	  can	  enhance	  the	  credibility	  of	  its	  threats	  through	  an	  initial	  strike	  without	  nullifying	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  its	  remaining	  weapons.	  	  This	  is	  an	  essential	  quality	  of	  a	  weapon	  to	  be	  used	  for	  coercion	  because,	  as	  Thomas	  Schelling	  pointed	  out,	   coercion	  works	   through	   the	   fear	  of	   future	  pain.	   	  Killing	  one	   hostage	   only	   coerces	   if	   there	   are	   others	   who	   remain	   in	   jeopardy.	   	   See	   Thomas	   Schelling,	   Arms	   and	  
Influence.	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vulnerabilities	  –	  reducing	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  future	  weapons.22	  	  Similarly,	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  a	  biological	  weapons	  attack,	   the	  victim’s	  military	   forces	  and	  population	  would	  don	  gas	  masks	   and	   take	   other	   steps	   to	   reduce	   their	   vulnerability	   to	   subsequent	   strikes.	   	  Within	  broader	  society,	  public	  health	  measures	  (for	  example,	  restrictions	  on	  travel	  and	  movement,	  the	   use	   of	   surgical	  masks,	   heightened	   health	  monitoring,	   and	   the	   isolation	   of	   contagious	  individuals)	  would	  reduce	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  follow-­‐on	  attacks.	  	  But,	  in	  contrast,	  the	  initial	  use	   of	   nuclear	  weapons	  would	   not	   nullify	   the	   nuclear	   arsenal	   to	   the	   degree	   that	   bio-­‐	   or	  cyber-­‐attacks	   would.	   	   Unless	   the	   victim	   of	   the	   nuclear	   attack	   can	   reliably	   shoot	   down	  ballistic	  missiles,	  which	  remains	  a	  very	  difficult	  undertaking,23	  a	  weak	  state	  can	  use	  nuclear	  weapons	  coercively	  and	  still	  retain	  the	  ability	  to	  conduct	  future	  attacks.	  	  Finally,	   the	   effects	  of	   nuclear	  weapons	  are	   far	  more	  predictable	   than	   cyber	  or	  bio	  weapons,	   an	   essential	   attribute	   for	   a	   leader	   who	   needs	   to	   coerce	   an	   immediate	   end	   to	  fighting.	   	   Nuclear	   weapons	   are	   more	   predictable	   on	   at	   least	   three	   key	   dimensions:	   the	  functioning	  of	  the	  weapon,	  the	  damage	  it	  will	  cause,	  and	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  effects.	   	  No	  one	  knows	  whether	  the	  coercive	  effect	  of	  a	  nuclear,	  or	  biological,	  or	  a	  cyber	  attack	  would	  work,	  as	  we	  discuss	  below.	  	  But	  leaders	  under	  duress	  could	  at	  least	  be	  confident	  that	  a	  well-­‐tested	  nuclear	  weapon	  would	  function;	  would	  create	  a	  reasonably	  predictable	  level	  of	  damage	  (as	  long	   as	   targeters	   selected	   a	   height	   of	   burst	   to	   prevent	   fallout);	   and	   would	   detonate	   at	  roughly	  the	  desired	  time.	  	  By	  contrast,	  one	  cannot	  know	  whether	  a	  cyber	  weapon	  will	  infect	  the	   target	   computer	   system	   –	   or	   whether	   an	   infection	   would	   produce	   the	   desired	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Those	   who	   examine	   the	   code	   may	   not	   merely	   learn	   about	   the	   vulnerabilities	   in	   the	   target	   computer	  system’s	   code,	   they	   may	   also	   learn	   about	   technical	   or	   organizational	   vulnerabilities	   that	   permitted	   the	  malware	   to	   be	   delivered	   to	   the	   target.	   	   For	   instance,	   computer	   networks	   that	   have	   no	   connectivity	   to	   the	  outside	  world	  have	  been	  penetrated	  by	  luring	  employees	  with	  access	  to	  unknowingly	  (or	   intentionally)	  use	  infected	  flash	  drives	  in	  the	  otherwise-­‐sealed-­‐off	  network.	  	  But	  once	  that	  vulnerability	  was	  exploited,	  re-­‐attack	  became	   more	   difficult	   (e.g.,	   workers	   at	   sensitive	   sites	   were	   warned	   about	   such	   operations,	   and	   in	   some	  organizations	   USB	   ports	   have	   been	   physically	   sealed).	   	   See	   Martin	   Libicki,	   Cyberdeterrence	   and	   Cyberwar,	  (Santa	  Monica,	   CA:	  RAND,	   2009),	   pp.	   56-­‐59.	   	   For	   a	   discussion	  of	   these	   issues	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   Stuxnet	  attack,	  see	  Kim	  Zetter	  “How	  Digital	  Detectives	  Deciphered	  Stuxnet,	  the	  Most	  Menacing	  Malware	  in	  History,”	  
Wired,	   July	   11,	   2011.	   	   Available	   at:	   http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/07/how-­‐digital-­‐detectives-­‐deciphered-­‐stuxnet/all/.	  23	  For	  a	  description	  of	  the	  enduring	  problem	  faced	  by	  all	  exoatmospheric	  hit-­‐to-­‐kill	  missile	  defense	  systems,	  differentiating	  warheads	   from	  decoys	   and	  debris	   out	   of	   the	   atmosphere,	   see	  George	  N.	   Lewis,	   Theodore	  A.	  Postol	   and	   John	   Pike,	   “Why	  National	  Missile	   Defense	  Won’t	  Work,”	   Scientific	  American,	   August	   1999.	   	   The	  enduring	  challenge	  is	  noted	  in	  Defense	  Science	  Board	  Task	  Force	  Report,	  “Science	  and	  Technology	  Issues	  of	  Early	  Intercept	  Ballistic	  Missile	  Defense	  Feasibility,”	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  September	  2011.	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malfunctions	  –	  until	  the	  weapon	  is	  used.24	  	   In	  many	  cases,	  no	  one	  can	  predict	  how	  long	  it	  will	   take	   for	   a	   cyber	   attack	   to	   disrupt	   the	   target	   computers,	   or	   assess	   the	   unintended	  consequences	   of	   the	   malware	   infecting	   other	   computer	   systems.	   	   Similarly,	   biological	  weapons	  may	  take	  considerable	  time	  to	  spread,	  to	  incubate	  in	  their	  victims,	  to	  be	  detected,	  and	  to	  be	  attributed	  –	  all	  of	  which	  must	  happen	  before	  an	  attack	  can	  generate	  a	  coercive	  effect.	  	  	  During	   wars,	   the	   leaders	   of	   the	   states	   on	   the	   losing	   side	  may	   face	   life-­‐and-­‐death	  pressure	  to	  rapidly	  force	  a	  ceasefire	  –	  even	  if	  their	  enemy	  is	  not	  seeking	  to	  conquer	  them	  or	  impose	  regime	  change.	  	  Conventional	  weapons	  provide	  little	  leverage	  in	  this	  regard	  –	  most	  of	  them	  become	  progressively	  more	  difficult	  for	  the	  weak	  to	  employ	  as	  the	  strong	  gains	  the	  upper	  hand	  militarily,	  and	  they	  generally	  inflict	  too	  little	  damage	  to	  shock	  the	  strong	  state	  into	  submitting	  to	  stalemate.25	  	  When	  NATO	  faced	  an	  overwhelming	  conventional	  military	  threat,	   it	   did	   not	   plan	   to	   stalemate	   the	   Warsaw	   Pact	   using	   highly	   uncertain	   biological	  weapons.	  	  If	  the	  challenge	  facing	  a	  leader	  is	  to	  stop	  a	  powerful	  aggressor	  immediately,	  then	  there	  is	  currently	  no	  substitute	  for	  nuclear	  weapons.	  
IS	  ESCALATION	  RATIONAL?	  POSING	  FOUR	  GRIM	  OPTIONS	  Losing	   a	   conventional	  war	   could	  have	   catastrophic	   consequences	   for	   the	  defeated	  society	  or	   leaders;	  but	  how	  could	  a	   country,	   facing	  an	  overpowering	   foe,	   employ	  nuclear	  weapons	   to	   create	   stalemate?	   	  Wouldn't	   the	   use	   of	   nuclear	  weapons	   by	   a	  weak	   country	  against	   a	   strong	   one	   incite	   a	   devastating	   nuclear	   response,	   rather	   than	   a	   truce?	   	   For	  example,	  in	  a	  war	  on	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula,	  wouldn’t	  North	  Korean	  use	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  against	   the	   Republic	   of	   Korea,	   Japan,	   or	   U.S.	   military	   forces	   in	   the	   region	   trigger	   a	  devastating	  U.S.	  nuclear	  retaliatory	  strike?	  	  If	  so,	  then	  nuclear	  escalation	  would	  simply	  turn	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Note	  that	  even	  after	  a	  cyber	  strike,	  gauging	  effectiveness	  is	  challenging.	  	  After	  years	  of	  self-­‐congratulation,	  evidence	   is	   emerging	   that	   the	  most	   famous	  offensive	   cyber	  attack	   in	  history	  –	  Stuxnet	  –	  was	  a	   tactical	   and	  strategic	   failure,	   even	   using	   the	   most	   modest	   definition	   of	   success	   (i.e.,	   temporary	   reduction	   in	   Iran’s	  enrichment	   of	   uranium	   at	   the	   Natanz	   facility).	   According	   to	   IAEA	   documents,	   the	   Stuxnet	   attack	   barely	  reduced	  Iran’s	  rate	  of	  uranium	  enrichment,	  which	  quickly	  returned	  to	  (or	  exceeded)	  pre-­‐Stuxnet	  rates.	   	  We	  thank	  Jonathan	  Lindsay	  for	  bringing	  this	  to	  our	  attention.	  25	  On	   the	   limits	   of	   coercion	   using	   conventional	  weapons,	   see	   Robert	   A.	   Pape,	  Bombing	   to	  Win:	  Airpower	   in	  
Coercion	  and	  War	   (Ithaca,	   NY:	   Cornell	   University	   Press,	   1996);	   for	   an	   insightful	   critique,	   see	   Karl	  Mueller,	  “Strategies	   of	   Coercion:	   Denial,	   Punishment,	   and	   the	   Future	   of	   Air	   Power,”	   Security	   Studies,	   Vol.	   7,	   No.	   3	  (Spring	  1998):	  182-­‐228.	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a	  conventional	  defeat	  into	  an	  even	  worse	  nuclear	  disaster.	  	  So,	  how	  could	  coercive	  nuclear	  escalation	  work?	  Working	  through	  that	  hypothetical	  scenario	  –	  a	  Korean	  War,	  five	  years	  in	  the	  future	  -­‐-­‐	   	   is	   revealing.	   	   A	   conflict	   on	   the	   Korean	   Peninsula	   could	   erupt	   through	   any	   number	   of	  paths,	   but	   regardless	   of	   how	   it	   started,	   relatively	   early	   in	   the	   conflict	   the	   conventional	  battle	  would	  likely	  start	  to	  favor	  the	  U.S.-­‐ROK	  alliance.26	  	  And	  according	  to	  statements	  from	  officials	  in	  Seoul	  and	  Washington,	  the	  alliance	  would	  quickly	  turn	  from	  defense	  to	  offense,	  and	  begin	  to	  move	  north	  of	  the	  DMZ.	  At	  that	  point,	  leaders	  in	  Pyongyang	  would	  face	  a	  stark	  choice.	  They	  could	  allow	  the	  conflict	  to	  continue	  on	  its	  course,	  and	  accept	  a	  similar	  fate	  of	  Qadaffi	   and	  Hussein,	   or	   they	   could	   ask	   themselves:	  what	  means	  do	  we	  have	   to	   force	   the	  United	  States	  and	  South	  Korea	  to	  immediately	  halt	  offensive	  operations?	  	  Nuclear	   escalation	   could	   take	   many	   possible	   forms:	   Pyongyang	  might	   begin	   with	  just	  a	  statement	  –	  demanding	  an	  immediate	  ceasefire	  and	  threatening	  nuclear	  escalation.	  	  If	  North	   Korea	   has	   nuclear	   weapons	   married	   to	   missiles,	   it	   could	   launch	   a	   missile	   and	  detonate	   it	   harmlessly	   over	   the	   Sea	   of	   Japan.	   	   If	   North	   Korea	   develops	  missiles	   that	   are	  accurate	  enough,	  it	  could	  launch	  a	  nuclear	  strike	  on	  a	  U.S.	  military	  base	  in	  the	  region,	  such	  as	   Kadena	   Air	   Base	   on	   the	   island	   of	   Okinawa,	   Japan.	   	   It	   could	   even	   strike	   a	   Japanese	   or	  South	  Korean	  city.	  	  But	  the	  most	  important	  aspect	  of	  a	  coercive	  escalatory	  operation	  is	  not	  the	   initial	   strike,	   but	   the	   threat	   of	  what	   is	   to	   come.	   	  Whatever	   the	   first	   step,	   Pyongyang	  could	  then	  declare	  that	  the	  United	  States	  and	  ROK	  must	  cease	  military	  operations	  against	  North	  Korea	  immediately,	  or	  else	  North	  Korea	  will	  destroy	  half	  a	  dozen	  Japanese	  cities.27	  	  Some	  analysts	  might	  assume	  that	  the	  United	  States	  would	  respond	  at	  this	  point	  with	  a	   devastating	   nuclear	   counter-­‐strike	   –	   especially	   if	   the	   North	   Korean	   coercive	   strategy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  See,	   for	   example,	  Anthony	  H.	  Cordesman,	   “The	  Korean	  Military	  Balance:	  Comparative	  Korean	  Forces	  and	  the	  Forces	  of	  Key	  Neighboring	  States,”	  Center	  for	  Strategic	  and	  International	  Studies,	  May	  6,	  2011;	  and	  “The	  Conventional	  Military	  Balance	  on	   the	  Korean	  Peninsula,”	   in	   IISS	  Strategic	  Dossier,	   “North	  Korea’s	  Weapons	  Programmes:	  A	  Net	  Assessment,”	  International	  Institute	  of	  Strategic	  Studies,	  January	  21,	  2004.	  	  27	  Of	  course,	  the	  issuance	  of	  such	  a	  threat	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  North	  Korea	  could	  carry	  out	  that	  operation.	  	  U.S.	  and	  allied	  missile	  defenses	  would	  attempt	  to	  shoot	  down	  North	  Korean	  missiles,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  allies	  might	  seek	  to	  prevent	  a	  follow-­‐up	  North	  Korean	  nuclear	  attack	  by	  launching	  a	  conventional	  or	  nuclear	  counterforce	  strike	  (as	  described	  below).	  	  The	  point	  here	  is	  that	  the	  issuance	  of	  a	  coercive	  nuclear	  threat	  by	  Pyongyang	  during	  a	  conventional	  war	  (perhaps	  in	  conjunction	  with	  a	  small	  nuclear	  strike)	  would	  not	  be	  irrational;	  far	  from	  “crazy”,	  such	  a	  strategy	  would	  mirror	  NATO’s	  Cold	  War	  plans	  for	  coercive	  nuclear	  escalation,	  which	  were	  also	  designed	  to	  create	  stalemate	  to	  avert	  a	  conventional	  military	  defeat.	  
	   	   	  	  
	  
21	  
involved	  an	  actual	  nuclear	   strike.	   	  But	   it	   is	   enlightening	   to	  consider	   carefully	   the	  options	  that	  a	  U.S.	  president	  would	  confront	  in	  such	  circumstances.	  	  Each	  of	  these	  options	  is	  grim.	  What	   options	   would	   a	   U.S.	   president	   have	   if	   North	   Korea	   used	   nuclear	   weapons	  coercively	  during	  a	  conventional	  war?	  	  How	  would	  the	  United	  States	  respond,	  for	  example,	  to	  North	  Korean	  nuclear	  attacks	  on	  Kadena	  Air	  Base	  and	  a	  Japanese	  city	  that	  killed	  several	  thousand	   Americans	   and	   two	   or	   three	   times	   that	   many	   Japanese?	   	   How	   would	   a	   U.S.	  president	   address	   Pyongyang’s	   threat	   to	   launch	   further	   strikes	   on	   Japanese	   cities	   unless	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  ROK	  accept	  a	  cease-­‐fire	  and	  halt	  their	  military	  campaign?	  	  In	  such	  a	  scenario,	  four	  principal	  courses	  of	  action	  would	  be	  available.28	  	  
Option	  One:	  Punitive	  Nuclear	  Retaliation.	  	  When	  many	  people	  initially	  confront	  the	  question	  –	  “How	  should	  the	  United	  States	  respond	  to	  a	  limited,	  coercive	  nuclear	  strike	  by	  North	  Korea	  on	  a	  U.S.	  military	  base?”	  –	  a	  common	  response	  is	  a	  more	  colorful	  version	  of	  “launch	  punitive	  nuclear	  retaliation.”	  	  In	  other	  words,	  one	  option	  would	  be	  to	  launch	  one	  or	  more	  nuclear	  attacks	  designed	  to	  kill	  the	  North	  Korean	  regime’s	  leaders	  and	  destroy	  the	  remaining	  institutions	  of	  the	  North	  Korean	  state.	  	  After	  the	  retaliatory	  strike,	  South	  Korean	  and	  U.S.	  forces	  would	  still	  march	  toward	  Pyongyang	  as	  soon	  as	  conditions	  allowed.	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  response	  would	  be	  to	  send	  a	  clear	  message	  to	  the	  world	  –	  nuclear	  escalation	  will	  beget	  a	  horrifying	  response.	  	  The	  disadvantages	  of	   this	  approach	  are	  substantial.	   	  First,	  and	  most	  obviously,	   the	  United	  States	  would	  be	  committing	  mass	  murder.	  	  Hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  North	  Korean	  civilians	  would	  be	  killed	  for	  acts	  committed	  by	  a	  small	  coterie	  of	  leaders.	  	  Second,	  nuclear	  strikes	   aimed	   at	   deeply	   buried	   leadership	   bunkers	   would	   require	   “ground	   bursts”	   –	  detonations	  well	  below	  any	  altitude	  that	  would	  avert	  fallout	  –	  and	  would	  therefore	  spread	  highly	   radioactive	  material	   across	   the	   region.	   	  Depending	   on	   the	   location	   of	   the	   bunkers	  and	   the	   season	   (which	   affects	   wind	   direction),	   lethal	   fallout	   would	   likely	   scatter	   across	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  To	  be	  clear,	  this	  scenario	  is	  merely	  intended	  to	  illustrate	  how	  coercive	  escalation	  might	  work	  –	  that	  is,	  to	  show	   the	   logic	   of	   coercive	   nuclear	   escalation	  by	   illustrating	   the	   terrible	   dilemmas	   faced	  by	   the	   victim	  of	   a	  coercive	  campaign.	  	  The	  details	  in	  any	  scenario	  are	  not	  predictable,	  and	  are	  not	  central	  to	  this	  analysis.	  	  The	  point	  here	  is	  that	  coercive	  escalation	  has	  a	  compelling	  logic,	  as	  NATO,	  Pakistan,	  and	  others	  have	  discovered.	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South	  Korea,	  and	  possibly	  Japan	  or	  China.29	  	  Finally,	  a	  punitive	  strike	  would	  not	  solve	  the	  major	  dilemma	  at	  hand:	  North	  Korean	  nuclear	  forces	  would	  presumably	  already	  have	  been	  dispersed	   and	   could	   still	   carry	   out	   their	   retaliatory	   nuclear	   strikes	   against	   Japan.	   	   The	  visceral	  “bomb	  them	  back	  to	  the	  stone	  age”	  response	  is	  problematic	  on	  many	  dimensions.	  	  
Option	  Two:	  Conventional	  Military	  Response.	  	  A	  second	  option	  would	  be	  to	  condemn	  the	  nuclear	  strike,	  send	  aid	  to	  the	  people	  of	  Okinawa,	  and	  accelerate	  the	  conventional	  offensive	  toward	  Pyongyang	  to	  end	  the	  war	  and	  capture	  the	  North	  Korean	  leadership	  as	  rapidly	  as	  possible.	  The	  advantage	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  that	  it	  reinforces	  the	  core	  of	  U.S.	  nuclear	  policy:	  by	  not	  giving	  in	  to	  coercion,	  and	  by	  not	  responding	  in	  kind,	  the	  U.S.	  response	  would	  demonstrate	  that	  nuclear	  weapons	  are	  both	  horrible	  and	  useless.	  	  The	  subsequent	  trials	  of	  surviving	  senior	  North	  Korean	  leaders	  would	  demonstrate	  to	  the	  leaders	  of	  other	  weak	  states	  that	  nuclear	  escalation	  is	  not	  a	  viable	  way	  to	  escape	  the	  calamity	  of	  military	  defeat.	  	  The	  disadvantages	  of	   this	  strategy	  are	  enormous.	   	  First,	   the	  strategy	  would	  accept	  the	   risk	   that	  North	  Korea	  would	  carry	  out	   its	   threat	  and	   launch	  nuclear	   strikes	  against	  a	  half-­‐dozen	   Japanese	   cities.	   	   There	   is	   substantial	   risk	   that	   some	   (perhaps	  many)	   of	   those	  missiles	  would	  leak	  through	  missile	  defenses.	   	  Second,	  and	  relatedly,	  this	  course	  of	  action	  would	  presumably	  be	   implemented	  over	   the	  strenuous	  objections	  of	   Japan’s	  government.	  	  The	   consequence	  would	   likely	  be	   the	  end	  of	   the	  U.S.-­‐Japan	  alliance.	   	  More	  broadly,	   if	   the	  United	  States	  ignores	  the	  pleas	  of	  a	  critical	  ally,	  and	  the	  consequences	  were	  the	  destruction	  of	  several	  of	   that	  ally’s	  cities	  (in	  a	  war	   in	  which	  the	  ally	  played	  no	  direct	  role),	  many	  U.S.	  allies	   around	   Asia	   and	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   world	  may	   rethink	   their	   tight	  military	   ties	   to	   the	  United	  States.	  	  	  
Option	  Three:	  Counterforce:	  Disarm,	  then	  Defeat.	  	  The	  third	  option	  would	  be	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  nuclear	  attack	  with	  a	  major	  military	  strike	  against	  known	  and	  suspected	  North	  Korean	  nuclear	  targets	  to	  prevent	  North	  Korea	  from	  launching	  additional	  weapons.	  	  A	  counterforce	  strike	  could	  be	  conducted	  with	  conventional	  weapons,	  nuclear	  weapons,	  or	  a	  mixture	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  We	  conducted	  fallout	  analysis	  of	  various	  hypothetical	  U.S.	  ground	  burst	  strikes	  against	  North	  Korea,	  using	  a	  U.S.	  Defense	  Department	  computer	  model	  called	  HPAC,	  and	  depending	  on	  the	  target	  location	  and	  season,	  the	  radioactive	  fallout	  from	  U.S.	  strikes	  might	  kill	  more	  South	  Korean	  civilians	  than	  North	  Koreans.	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two,	  with	  respective	  implications	  for	  the	  promptness	  of	  destroying	  the	  intended	  targets	  and	  the	  likelihood	  of	  destroying	  them	  all.	  	  This	  option,	  like	  the	  others,	  would	  rely	  on	  imperfect	  missile	  defenses	  to	  help	  with	  any	  North	  Korean	  weapons	  surviving	  a	  U.S.	  strike.	  	  And,	  as	  with	  the	  first	  two	  options,	  a	  rapid	  conventional	  advance	  on	  Pyongyang	  to	  conquer	  the	  regime	  and	  seize	  any	  surviving	  leaders	  would	  follow	  this	  strategy.	  	  The	  advantage	  of	  this	  option	  is	  that	  it	  would	  avoid	  giving	  in	  to	  nuclear	  blackmail,	  and	  it	  would	  take	  direct	  action	  to	  protect	  U.S.	  allies	  as	  much	  as	  possible.	  	  The	   disadvantages	   of	   this	   option,	   however,	   are	   substantial.	   	   First,	   a	   counterforce	  attack	  would	  not	  be	  a	  small	  operation.	  	  It	  would	  likely	  require	  prompt	  attacks	  on	  scores	  of	  targets	   across	   North	   Korea	   in	   order	   to	   rapidly	   destroy	   suspected	   nuclear	   storage	   sites,	  military	  command	  and	  control,	  mobile	  missile	  garrisons,	  and	  tunnel	  entrances	  which	  may	  be	   associated	   with	   North	   Korea’s	   nuclear	   weapons	   or	   missile	   launchers.	   	   The	   nuclear	  component	  of	   the	  attack	  might	   involve	  several	  dozen	  –	  or	  more	  –	  U.S.	  weapons.	   	  Second,	  depending	  upon	  the	  details	  of	  the	  U.S.	  operation,	  and	  the	  location	  of	  North	  Korean	  targets,	  the	  U.S.	  strikes	  could	  kill	  a	   large	  number	  of	  North	  Koreans.	   	   (This	  would	  probably	  be	   the	  case	   even	   if	   U.S.	   strikes	   did	   not	   generate	   regional	   radioactive	   fallout,	   as	   in	   the	   counter-­‐leadership	   –	   or	   punitive	   –	   option	   described	   above).30	  	   A	   third	   disadvantage	   is	   that	   a	  counterforce	  strike	  would	  probably	  not	  destroy	  every	  North	  Korean	  nuclear	  weapon;	  some	  weapons	  might	  survive	  and	  be	  used	  against	  U.S.	  allies.	  	  This	  option,	  therefore,	  like	  the	  first	  two,	   accepts	   a	   high	   likelihood	   of	   one	   or	   more	   allied	   cities	   being	   destroyed,	   along	   with	  subsequent	   damage	   to	   the	   U.S.	   global	   alliance	   network	   and	   grand	   strategy.	   	   This	   option	  becomes	  more	   perilous	   the	   closer	   that	  North	  Korea	  moves	   toward	   deploying	   long-­‐range	  ballistic	  missiles	  that	  can	  target	  U.S.	  cities,	  as	  well	  as	  regional	  allies.31	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  It	  is	  critical	  to	  note	  that	  strikes	  on	  tunnel	  entrances	  and	  other	  hardened	  facilities	  may	  not	  require	  ground	  bursts,	  and	  appear	  to	  be	  possible	  without	  creating	  significant	  fallout.	   	  Unlike	  a	  “punitive”	  strike	  designed	  to	  kill	  the	  leadership	  (option	  1)	  the	  nuclear	  missions	  in	  option	  3	  do	  not	  need	  to	  destroy	  deeply	  buried	  facilities	  –	  but	   could	   merely	   destroy	   the	   near-­‐surface	   elements	   of	   those	   facilities	   (using	   air	   bursts)	   to	   disable	   the	  weapons	  or	  prevent	  them	  from	  being	  used	  until	   teams	  could	  seize	  the	  sites.	   	  Declassified	  documents	  reveal	  that	  the	  United	  States	  has	  been	  planning	  low-­‐fallout,	  low-­‐casualty	  nuclear	  options	  for	  decades.	  31	  Before	   leaving	  office,	   former	   Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Robert	  Gates	   endorsed	  U.S.	   intelligence	   estimates	   that	  North	  Korea	  was	  (in	  2011)	  within	  five	  years	  of	  being	  able	  to	  strike	  the	  continental	  United	  States	  with	  a	  long-­‐range	  missile.	  The	  December	  2012	  partial	  success	  of	  a	  test	  of	  a	  North	  Korean	  satellite	  launch	  vehicle	  reflects	  a	  big	  leap	  forward	  for	  Pyongyang,	  and	  may	  have	  been	  fueled	  by	  increased	  Iranian	  technical	  assistance	  (Iran’s	  satellite	   launch	  program	  has	  been	   far	  more	   successful	   than	  North	  Korea’s).	   	  On	   the	  December	  2012	  North	  Korean	  missile	   launch,	   see	  Choe	   Sang-­‐Hum	  and	  David	  E.	   Sanger,	   “North	  Koreans	  Launch	  Rocket	   in	  Defiant	  




Option	  Four:	  Ceasefire:	  Prevent	  Further	  Escalation.	  	  The	  argument	  in	  favor	  of	  accepting	  a	  ceasefire	  is	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  on	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula	  that	  is	  worth	  fighting	  a	  major	  nuclear	  war.	  	  A	  nuclear	  exchange	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  North	  Korea	  would	  likely	  kill	  large	  numbers	  of	  Koreans	  (especially	  if	  North	  Korean	  nuclear	  sites	  were	  near	  populated	  areas),	  and	  could	  lead	  to	  substantial	  retaliation	  against	  U.S.	  regional	  allies.	  	  If	  Japan	  or	  other	  allies	  in	  the	  region	  were	  subsequently	  struck,	  it	  might	  be	  the	  end	  of	  the	  U.S.	  alliance	  network	  in	  East	  Asia,	  as	  well	  as	  undermine	  U.S.	  nuclear	  umbrella	  commitments	  to	  dozens	  of	  other	  countries.	  	  Advocates	  of	  a	  ceasefire	  could	  argue	  that	  the	  North	  Korean	  regime	  would	  be	  further	  isolated	  by	  its	  conduct	  –	  for	  example,	  China	  would	  feel	  immense	  pressure	  to	  cut	  off	  any	  assistance	  for	  Pyongyang	  after	  such	  events	  –	  and	  suggest	  that	  the	  regime	  would	  thus	  soon	  collapse.	  	  Most	  important,	  one	  could	  argue	  that	  the	  potentially	  huge	  political	  and	  strategic	  implications	  of	  buckling	  to	  nuclear	  coercion	  could	  be	  mitigated.	  	  For	  example,	  before	  accepting	  the	  “ceasefire”	  option,	  the	  United	  States	  might	  levy	  a	  symbolic	  U.S.	  nuclear	  response	  (e.g.,	  responding	  to	  a	  North	  Korean	  strike	  on	  Kadena	  Air	  Base	  with	  a	  nuclear	  response	  against	  one	  or	  more	  North	  Korean	  military	  facilities)	  before	  halting	  military	  operations.32	  	  A	  globally	  respected	  international	  figure	  could	  also	  be	  encouraged	  to	  make	  a	  public	  plea	  –	  on	  behalf	  of	  all	  humanity	  –	  that	  both	  sides	  cease	  military	  actions	  immediately.33	  The	   downsides	   of	   accepting	   a	   ceasefire	   are	   also	   very	   significant.	   Accepting	   a	  negotiated	  settlement	  after	  suffering	  a	  nuclear	  strike	  (or	  after	  receiving	  an	  explicit	  nuclear	  threat)	  might	  be	  very	  costly	  politically	  –	  both	  for	  the	  United	  States	  and	  personally	  for	  the	  American	  president.	  	  U.S.	  leaders	  would	  worry	  about	  the	  precedent	  it	  set,	  in	  which	  a	  weak	  state	   coerced	   the	   ceasefire	   it	   needed	   by	   threatening	   or	   attacking	   the	   United	   States	  with	  nuclear	  weapons.	   	  Such	  a	  strategy	  could	  trigger	  a	  new	  wave	  of	  proliferation	  –	  not	  only	  by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Act,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  December	  1,	  2012.	   	  On	   Iranian	  assistance	   for	   the	  North	  Korean	  missile	  program,	  see	  John	   S.	   Park,	   “The	   Leap	   in	   North	   Korea’s	   Ballistic	   Missile	   Program:	   The	   Iran	   Factor,”	   NBR	   Analysis	   Brief,	  December	  19,	  2012;	  and	  Jeffrey	  Lewis,	  “Iranians	  in	  North	  Korea?”	  ArmsControlWonk.com,	  December	  5,	  2012.	  32	  To	   be	   clear,	   the	   U.S.	   nuclear	   response	   in	   this	   option	   would	   not	   be	   designed	   to	   kill	   the	   North	   Korean	  leadership	  or	  disarm	  its	  nuclear	  forces	  (options	  1	  and	  3,	  respectively).	  	  The	  goal	  would	  simply	  be	  to	  provide	  political	  cover	  for	  the	  ceasefire.	  33	  The	  United	  States	  employed	  a	  similar	  strategy	  –	  as	  a	  backup	  plan	  in	  case	  the	  blockade	  failed	  –	  during	  the	  Cuban	   missile	   crisis.	   	   The	   White	   House	   established	   a	   contingency	   plan	   to	   secretly	   ask	   the	   UN	   General	  Secretary	  to	  intervene	  and	  urge	  both	  sides	  to	  reach	  a	  compromise.	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adversaries,	   but	   also	   by	   allies	   that	   lose	   faith	   in	   the	   U.S.	   nuclear	   umbrella.	   	   And	   while	  symbolic	  escalation	  and	  subterfuge	  might	  make	  the	  “deal”	  politically	  palatable	  in	  the	  short	  term,	  when	  the	  dust	  settled	  it	  would	  become	  apparent	  that	  coercive	  escalation	  had	  worked.	  None	  of	  the	  response	  options	  discussed	  above	  are	  attractive.	  	  The	  reflexive	  course	  of	  action	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  a	  nuclear	  attack	  on	  an	  ally	  –	  a	  devastating	  nuclear	  retaliatory	  strike	  –	  is	  not	  grounded	  in	  a	  careful	  assessment	  of	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  that	  response.	   	  A	  U.S.	  president	   might	   select	   that	   option,	   but	   nothing	   about	   such	   a	   decision	   is	   preordained.	  	  Others	  believe	  that	  the	  United	  States	  would	  select	  the	  counter-­‐force	  option;	  once	  an	  enemy	  has	   used	   nuclear	   weapons,	   a	   U.S.	   president	   would	   have	   no	   alternative	   to	   destroying	   as	  many	  of	  those	  weapons	  as	  possible.	  	  (It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  current	  proposals	  regarding	  the	  future	  of	  the	  U.S.	  nuclear	  arsenal	  make	  the	  nuclear	  force	  less	  well	  suited	  for	  a	  counterforce	  strike.)	  All	  the	  response	  options	  in	  this	  scenario	  are	  grim,	  but	  options	  three	  and	  four	  would	  likely	   dominate	   the	   first	   two.	   	   Marching	   to	   Pyongyang	   and	   simply	   absorbing	   additional	  attacks	  on	  Japanese	  cities	  –	  praying	  that	  missile	  defense	  will	  work	  flawlessly	  –	  (i.e.,	  option	  two)	  seems	  unviable,	  as	  does	  a	  punitive	  counterstrike	  not	  specifically	  focused	  on	  disarming	  the	  North	  Korean	  nuclear	  arsenal	  (option	  one).	  	  The	  wrenching	  decision	  for	  a	  U.S.	  president	  would	   be	   whether	   to	   order	   a	   nuclear	   counterforce	   strike	   to	   disarm	   the	   enemy	   (option	  three),	  or	  whether	  to	  accept	  a	  ceasefire	  with	  some	  attempt	  at	  saving	  face	  (option	  four).	  	  The	  key	   factor	   pushing	   a	   U.S.	   leader	   toward	   option	   three	   or	   option	   four	   is	   the	   likely	  effectiveness	   of	   a	   counterforce	   strike.	   	   If	   a	   president	   believed	   that	   a	   counterforce	   strike	  would	  leave	  the	  enemy	  with	  zero	  –	  or	  perhaps	  a	  couple	  –	  deliverable	  nuclear	  weapons,	  and	  if	   he	   or	   she	   believed	   that	   it	  was	   possible	   to	   execute	   such	   an	   attack	  without	   killing	   large	  numbers	   of	   noncombatants	   (particularly	   allied	   civilians),	   he	   or	   she	   might	   lean	   in	   that	  direction.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  the	  president	  believed	  that	  a	  counterforce	  strike	  would	  still	  permit	  the	  adversary	  to	  destroy	  many	  allied	  cities	  –	  or	  U.S.	  cities	  –	  he	  or	  she	  might	  prefer	  a	  face-­‐saving	  symbolic	  strike	  followed	  by	  a	  ceasefire.	  	  	  One	   can	   only	   speculate	   about	   what	   a	   U.S.	   president	   might	   do	   under	   these	  circumstances.	   	   But	   what	   should	   be	   clear	   from	   this	   illustrative	   scenario	   is	   that	   an	  adversary’s	   coercive	   nuclear	   strategy	   might	   work:	   it	   might	   induce	   the	   stronger	   state	   –	  whomever	  that	  might	  be	  –	  to	  opt	  for	  a	  ceasefire	  (option	  four).	  	  Why	  would	  North	  Korea	  –	  or	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Pakistan,	  China,	  or	  (in	  the	  future)	  Iran	  –	  believe	  nuclear	  coercion	  might	  create	  stalemate?	  For	  that	  matter,	  why	  did	  NATO	  stake	  its	  survival	  on	  the	  belief	  that	  it	  could	  induce	  stalemate	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  conventional	  war	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union?	  	  The	  answer	  is	  clear:	  if	  weak	  states	  can	   deploy	   enough	   nuclear	  weapons,	   or	   deploy	   them	   in	   a	   fashion	   that	  makes	   them	   very	  difficult	   to	   destroy,	   strong	   states	  would	   likely	   have	   few	  palatable	   reactions	   to	   a	   coercive	  nuclear	  escalatory	  campaign.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  coercive	  escalation	  by	  weak	  states	  should	  be	  acknowledged	  as	  a	  rational	  strategy,	  especially	   if	  weaker	  actors	  (like	  Pakistan	  and,	   in	  the	  past,	   NATO	   and	   Israel)	   build	   a	   force	   that	   is	   sufficiently	   invulnerable	   to	   a	   disarming,	  counterforce	   strike.	   	   In	   short,	   relatively	  weak	   states	  will	   face	   powerful	   incentives	   to	   use	  nuclear	   weapons	   against	   the	   strong	   during	   a	   conventional	   war	   in	   order	   to	   induce	  stalemate.	  
EVIDENCE	  OF	  COERCIVE	  NUCLEAR	  DOCTRINES	  Nuclear	  weapons	  have	   the	   capacity	   to	  be	   the	  ultimate	   tools	  of	   stalemate.	   	   If	  weak	  nuclear-­‐armed	   states	   feel	   sufficiently	   threatened	   by	   a	  militarily	   superior	   foe,	   they	   could	  develop	   defense	   plans	   around	   the	   concept	   of	   coercive	   nuclear	   escalation,	   and	   create	  nuclear	  doctrines	   for	  wartime	  employment.	  This	   report,	   so	   far,	  makes	   the	   case	   that	   such	  steps	  are	  logical.	  	  But	  do	  countries	  actually	  follow	  this	  cold-­‐blooded	  logic?	  	  To	  explore	  whether	  weak	  states	  actually	  employ	   this	   logic,	  we	   first	   identify	  below	  the	   conditions	   under	   which	   states	   would	   be	   most	   likely	   to	   build	   defense	   plans	   around	  doctrines	   of	   coercive	   nuclear	   escalation.	   	   Second,	   we	   sort	   nuclear-­‐armed	   countries	  according	  to	  those	  conditions.	  	  Finally,	  we	  determine	  whether	  those	  states	  that	  (according	  to	  our	  argument)	  should	  have	  adopted	  coercive	  nuclear	  doctrines	  have	  actually	  done	  so.	  	  Two	  factors	  should	  have	  a	  powerful	  effect	  on	  whether	  nuclear-­‐armed	  states	  develop	  coercive	  nuclear	  doctrines.	  	  First,	  countries	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  view	  nuclear	  weapons	  in	  this	  manner	   if	   they	   expect	   to	   lose	   conventional	   wars.	   	   In	   other	   words,	   coercive	   nuclear	  doctrines	   should	   be	   far	   more	   appealing	   to	   the	   weak	   than	   to	   the	   strong.	   	   Second,	   these	  doctrines	   will	   be	   more	   attractive	   to	   states	   for	   which	   the	   consequences	   of	   conventional	  military	  defeat	  are	  dire.	  	  When	  the	  United	  States	  loses	  conventional	  wars	  –	  e.g.,	  in	  Vietnam,	  perhaps	   in	  Afghanistan	  –	   it	  may	  damage	  presidential	  approval,	  but	   the	   republic	  does	  not	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fall,	   and	   leaders	   are	   not	   hung.	   	   For	   other	   states	   and	   leaders,	   defeat	   often	   brings	   terrible	  consequences.	   	   Many	   Israelis	   believe	   that	   the	   consequences	   of	   a	   military	   defeat	   to	   the	  Syrians	  or	  Egyptians	  would	  mean	  the	  end	  of	  sovereignty	  at	  best	  –	  and	  genocide	  at	  worst.	  	  Even	   countries	   that	   do	   not	   fear	   military	   conquest	   might	   worry	   that	   a	   humiliating	  conventional	   defeat	  might	   trigger	   uprisings	   or	   coups,	   and	   the	   overthrow	   of	   the	   existing	  regime	  (often	  including	  the	  death	  of	  the	  leaders	  themselves).	  	  If	  the	  United	  States	  dealt	  an	  overwhelming	  defeat	  to	  the	  Iranian	  military	  during	  a	  conflict	  over	  the	  Strait	  of	  Hormuz,	  it	  is	  not	   clear	   that	   the	   Islamic	  Republic	  would	   survive	   the	   political	   turmoil	   that	   could	   follow.	  Observers	  of	  China	  have	  noted	  that	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  (CCP)	  no	  longer	  bases	  its	  legitimacy	  on	  communism,	  but	  rather	  on	  nationalism	  and	  evidence	  that	  the	  CCP	  has	  made	  China	   strong	   and	   globally	   respected.	   	   If	   during	   a	  military	   clash	   in	   the	   Pacific,	   the	  United	  States	  inflicted	  a	  crushing	  defeat	  against	  the	  Chinese	  air	  force	  and	  navy,	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  CCP	  may	  reasonably	  question	  whether	  their	  government	  could	  survive	  the	  humiliation	  and	  anger	   from	   the	   people	   or	   military.	   	   Leaders	   of	   nuclear-­‐armed	   states	   who	   fear	   that	  conventional	  military	   defeat	   could	   lead	   to	   terrible	   consequences	   for	   themselves	   or	   their	  country	  would	  be	  expected,	  if	  the	  arguments	  in	  this	  report	  are	  correct,	  to	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  develop	  coercive	  nuclear	  doctrines	  than	  those	  who	  do	  not	  share	  this	  fear.	  Figure	   1	   illustrates	   our	   claim	   graphically	   and	   offers	   a	   first-­‐cut	   at	   identifying	  strategically	   relevant	   dyads	   along	   these	   two	   dimensions.	   	   Each	   of	   the	   two	   variables	   we	  describe	  is,	   in	  reality,	  continuous:	  the	  expected	  likelihood	  of	  defeat	   in	  a	  conventional	  war	  could	  be	  any	  value	  between	  0	  and	  1;	  and	  the	  negative	  consequences	  of	  defeat	  could	  range	  from	  nothing	  to	  total	  annihilation.	   	  But	  to	  facilitate	  coding	  –	  and	  avoid	  suggesting	  greater	  precision	  than	  is	  possible	  using	  these	  variables	  –	  we	  treat	  each	  of	  the	  variables	  as	  if	  it	  were	  binary,	  thus	  resulting	  in	  four	  categories.	  	  If	  our	  argument	  about	  coercive	  nuclear	  escalation	  is	  correct,	  then	  the	  countries	  represented	  in	  the	  dyads	  in	  the	  upper-­‐right	  corner	  –	  i.e.,	  those	  nuclear-­‐armed	   state	   that	   expect	   to	   suffer	   conventional	   defeats	   over	   issues	   of	   grave	  importance	   –	   should	   be	   most	   likely	   to	   adopt	   coercive	   nuclear	   doctrines.	   	   Those	   in	   the	  bottom	  left	  corner	  should	  be	  least	   likely.	   	  (Because	  the	  current	  strategic	  circumstances	  of	  various	  NATO	  allies	  are	  so	  different	  from	  each	  other	  –	  with	  the	  Baltic	  countries	  facing	  very	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different	   military	   threats	   than	   France	   or	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   –	   we	   have	   located	   Baltic	  NATO	  separately	  from	  the	  other	  alliance	  members.)34	  
	  	   Figure	   2	   reproduces	   the	   first	   figure,	   but	   it	   also	   indicates	   (in	   bold	   text)	   which	  countries	  appear	   to	  have	  adopted	  a	   coercive	  nuclear	  doctrine	  and	  possess	   the	   theater	  or	  battlefield	   nuclear	   capabilities	   to	   execute	   it.	   	   (As	   described	   above,	   in	   the	   case	   of	  contemporary	   NATO,	   we	   separate	   out	   the	   Baltic	   states,	   because	   they	   are	   located	   in	   a	  different	   strategic	   quadrant	   from	   the	   other	   NATO	   members,	   and	   they	   have	   different	  preferences	  regarding	  NATO	  nuclear	  doctrine).	   	  Figure	  2	  also	  highlights	  (in	  gray	  text)	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  The	  Baltic	  countries	  are	  not	  nuclear-­‐armed	  states,	  of	  course,	  but	  they	  are	  covered	  by	  NATO’s	  nuclear	  umbrella.	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Figure 1: Which States Are Expected to Adopt Coercive Escalatory Doctrines? !
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countries	  that	  have	  not	  articulated	  doctrines	  for	  the	  coercive	  use	  of	  nuclear	  escalation.	  	  One	  state	  –	  North	  Korea	  –	  is	  ambiguous	  about	  its	  nuclear	  doctrine.35	  	  
	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Critics	   may	   object	   that	   Figures	   1	   and	   2	   should	   include	   all	   states	   –	   and	   locate	   them	   along	   these	   two	  dimensions	  –	  not	  merely	  the	  nuclear-­‐armed	  countries.	  	  After	  all,	  the	  theory	  we’ve	  advanced	  predicts	  that	  any	  state	  that	  perceived	  a	  high	  chance	  of	  suffering	  a	  costly	  military	  defeat	  would	  be	  powerfully	  inclined	  to	  adopt	  a	  coercive	  nuclear	  doctrine	  –	  even	  if	  that	  first	  required	  acquiring	  nuclear	  weapons.	  	  We	  agree	  with	  this	  logic	  up	  to	  a	  point,	  but	  the	  critique	  goes	  too	  far.	  	  A	  large	  body	  of	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  proliferation	  decisions	  involve	  a	  careful	  balancing	  of	  security	  concerns	  with	  a	  host	  of	  factors	  arising	  from	  domestic	  politics:	  e.g.,	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  military	  organizations	  (who	  often	  oppose	  these	  weapons);	  the	  interests	  of	  various	  parts	  of	  a	  country’s	  scientific	  community;	  commercial	  interests,	  which	  might	  fear	  sanctions	  and	  isolation.	  	  Even	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  security	  concerns,	  the	  logic	  is	  far	  from	  deterministic	  because	  several	  countries	  (e.g.,	  South	  Korea,	  Taiwan,	  and	  Japan)	   have	   directly	   linked	   their	   non-­‐proliferation	   stance	   to	   promises	   of	   military	   support	   by	   the	   United	  States.	   	   Acquiring	   nuclear	  weapons	   and	   adopting	   coercive	   nuclear	   doctrines	  would	  mitigate	   some	   security	  concerns	   for	   these	   countries	   and	  exacerbate	  others.	   	   In	   short,	  we	  are	  not	  offering	  a	   theory	  of	  proliferation	  here,	  but	  rather	  an	  explanation	   for	   the	  adoption	  of	  coercive	  nuclear	  doctrines	  by	  nuclear-­‐armed	  states.	   	  By	  doing	  so,	  we	  assess	  the	  likelihood	  of	  deliberate	  nuclear	  escalation	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  conventional	  wars.	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Overall,	   Figure	   2	   suggests	   that	   the	   nuclear-­‐weapon	   states	   that	   worry	  most	   about	  calamitous	   military	   defeat	   tend	   to	   develop	   coercive	   nuclear	   doctrines	   to	   give	   them	   the	  capability	   to	   stalemate	   their	  most-­‐threatening	   adversary.	   	  NATO	   thought	   this	  way	   in	   the	  Cold	  War;	  Pakistan	  and	  Russia	  do	  today;	  and	  the	  only	  members	  of	  NATO	  who	  face	  the	  real	  possibility	   of	   disastrous	   military	   defeat	   are	   the	   same	   ones	   who	   most	   strongly	   favor	  retaining	   NATO’s	   forward-­‐deployed	   tactical	   nuclear	   weapons	   (B61	   bombs	   deployed	   in	  Europe).	   	   It	   is	  worth	  noting	  that	  North	  Korea	   is	   left	  un-­‐coded,	  because	   it	  has	  not	  publicly	  articulated	   enough	   to	   identify	   an	   explicit	   nuclear	   doctrine,	   though	   the	   Pyongyang	  government	   has	   certainly	   issued	   statements	   that	   suggest	   a	   willingness	   to	   use	   nuclear	  weapons	  –	  or	  other	  unspecified	  means	  –	  to	  punish	  its	  enemies	  if	  it	  were	  attacked.	  	  China	  is	  the	   clear	   outlier	   –	   the	   country	   that	   avows	   a	   “no	   first	   use”	   nuclear	   doctrine	   despite	   its	  location	  in	  the	  upper-­‐right	  corner.36	  Finally,	   it	   is	  notable	   that	   the	  nuclear-­‐armed	  states	  not	  only	   sort	   themselves	   in	   the	  predicted	   fashion	  on	  Figure	  2,	  but	  also	  several	   countries	  changed	  nuclear	  doctrines	  soon	  after	   they	  moved	   from	   one	   quadrant	   to	   another.	   	   During	   the	   Cold	  War,	  when	  NATO	   felt	  unable	  to	  defend	  itself	  adequately	  from	  a	  major	  conventional	  attack,	  it	  adopted	  a	  coercive	  nuclear	  doctrine.	  	  When	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  shifted	  –	  moving	  most	  NATO	  countries	  from	  the	  upper-­‐right	   to	   the	   lower-­‐left	  quadrants	  –	  so	  did	   the	  views	  of	  many	  alliance	  members	  about	  NATO’s	  nuclear	  doctrine,	  and	  even	  about	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  weapons	  they	  recently	  relied	  upon	   themselves.37	  	  Russia	  shifted	   in	   the	  opposite	  direction.	   	  During	   the	  Cold	  War,	  Russia	   supported	   (at	   least	   rhetorically)	   the	   position	   of	   “no	   first	   use,”	   but	   now	   that	   the	  military	  balance	  has	  shifted	  sharply	  against	  them	  Russian	  officials	  have	  publicly	  stated	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  We	  recently	  attended	  a	  conference	   in	  Washington	  (2012)	   in	  which	  several	  U.S.	  government	  officials	  with	  expertise	   on	   China,	   and	  who	   have	   responsibilities	   that	   include	   U.S.-­‐China	   nuclear	   relations,	   conveyed	   that	  they	  believe	  China’s	  “no	  first	  use”	  pledges	  should	  not	  be	  interpreted	  literally.	  	  They	  indicated	  that	  discussions	  with	   official	   Chinese	   delegations	   about	   these	   issues	   reinforced	   the	   impression	   that	   China’s	   actual	   nuclear	  policy	   is	  more	  nuanced	   than	   “no	   first	   use,”	   and	   that	  China’s	   representatives	   indicated	   that	   a	   range	  of	   non-­‐nuclear	  U.S.	  military	  actions	  might	  trigger	  Chinese	  nuclear	  response.	  	  But,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  coding	  consistency,	  we	  coded	  China	  as	  not	  having	  a	  coercive	  nuclear	  doctrine.	  37	  In	  fact,	  some	  statements	  by	  current	  and	  former	  U.S.	  officials	  to	  justify	  the	  ongoing	  U.S.	  effort	  to	  delegitimize	  nuclear	  weapons	  and	  work	  toward	  global	  nuclear	  disarmament	  note	  that	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  allies	  have	  the	  world’s	  most	  powerful	  conventional	   forces	   in	   the	  world	  –	   implicitly	  acknowledging	  that	   these	  weapons	  were	  once	  useful	  because	  NATO	  and	  the	  U.S.	  were	  “weak.”	   	  Those	  statements	  never	  draw	  attention	  to	  some	  	  darker	  implications:	  that	  weak	  states	  will	  resist	  efforts	  to	  deny	  them	  their	  needed	  instrument	  of	  stalemate	  as	  vigorously	  as	  NATO	  rejected	  Soviet	  suggestions	  for	  a	  mutual	  “no	  first	  use”	  pledge	  during	  the	  Cold	  War,	  and	  that	  efforts	  to	  delegitimize	  these	  weapons	  may	  come	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  U.S.	  allies	  who	  still	   feel	  some	  risk	  of	  catastrophic	  military	  defeat	  (i.e.,	  Israel).	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they	   rely	   upon	   tactical	   and	   theater	   nuclear	   weapons	   to	   balance	   against	   the	   superior	  military	  forces	  of	  an	  unspecified	  powerful	  alliance.	  The	  overarching	  argument	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  this	  report	  is	  that	  the	  same	  escalation	  dynamics	   that	   existed	   during	   the	   Cold	   War	   exist	   today	   as	   well	   –	   and	   they	   are	   just	   as	  powerful.	   	   Nuclear	   deterrence	   is	   not	   a	   legacy	  mission,	   because	   states	   still	   face	   the	   same	  critical	  national	   security	   threats	   they	   faced	  during	   the	  Cold	  War	   and	   throughout	  history:	  namely,	  the	  leaders	  of	  weak	  states	  fear	  that	  the	  strong	  will	  conquer	  them	  or	  take	  steps	  that	  will	   lead	   to	   their	   downfall.	   	   The	  high-­‐stakes	  poker	   game	  of	   international	   politics	   has	  not	  fundamentally	  changed	  –	  contrary	  to	  the	  claims	  of	  many	  observers.	   	  What	  has	  principally	  changed	  is	  merely	  who	  has	  the	  best	  cards.	  	  Those	  who	  were	  weak	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  are	  now	  strong;	  and	  another	  set	  of	  militarily	  “weak”	  countries	  –	  such	  as	  North	  Korea,	  Iran,	  and	  even	   China	   and	   Russia	   –	   now	   clutch	   nuclear	   weapons	   to	   defend	   themselves	   from	  overwhelming	  military	  might,	  just	  as	  NATO	  once	  did.	  The	   failure	   of	   analysts	   in	   the	   West	   to	   appreciate	   the	   continued	   value	   of	   nuclear	  weapons	  reflects	  a	  striking	  lack	  of	  strategic	  empathy.	   	  The	  first	  rule	  of	  good	  strategy	  is	  to	  develop	   an	   understanding	   of	   how	   one’s	   adversaries	   see	   the	  world,	   and	   how	   they	  might	  utilize	  their	  resources	  to	  achieve	  their	  goals.	  	  Analysts	  in	  the	  United	  States	  who	  claim	  that	  nuclear	  weapons	  are	  essentially	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  21st	  Century	  either	  ignore	  this	   dictum	   or	   have	   forgotten	   what	   was	   once	   better	   understood:	   how	   helpful	   these	  weapons	  can	  be	  for	  stalemating	  the	  strong.	  
IDENTIFYING	  THE	  MOST	  DANGEROUS	  CONFLICTS	  Weak	   countries	   have	   a	   powerful	   interest	   in	   using	   nuclear	   weapons	   during	   a	  conventional	   war	   to	   create	   a	   stalemate	   and	   prevent	   catastrophic	   defeat.	   	   And,	   as	   we	  illustrated	  above,	  they	  have	  historically	  adopted	  nuclear	  doctrines	  for	  exactly	  that	  purpose.	  	  But	  for	  U.S.	  policymakers	  and	  senior	  military	  leaders,	  the	  key	  question	  is	  not	  about	  the	  past	  but	   the	   future:	  which	  potential	  U.S.	   adversaries	   and	   conflicts	   are	  most	   prone	   to	   coercive	  escalation?	   	  More	  broadly,	  which	  of	   the	  world’s	   “hotspots”	  are	  prone	   to	  see	  conventional	  wars	  escalate	  and	  become	  nuclear	  conflicts?	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Plausibility	  of	  Conquest	  The	   logic	   developed	   throughout	   this	   report	   suggests	   three	   conditions	   that	   should	  help	   identify	   the	  most	   escalation-­‐prone	   conflicts.	   	   First,	   leaders	   should	   be	  most	   likely	   to	  take	  the	  risks	  associated	  with	  nuclear	  escalation	  if	  the	  war	  they	  are	  waging	  may	  lead	  to	  the	  conquest	  of	  their	  country.	  	  A	  state’s	  political	  and	  military	  leaders	  (and	  not	  just	  the	  top	  few)	  stand	   to	   lose	  power,	  wealth,	   the	  ability	   to	  protect	   their	   families,	   and	   in	  many	  cases	   their	  own	  lives	  –	  either	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  conquering	  government	  or	  angry	  domestic	  rivals.	  	  For	  the	  conquered	  society,	  occupation	  can	  be	  disastrous	  even	  if	  the	  conqueror	  has	  no	  desire	  to	  inflict	  collective	  punishment.	  	  The	  factors	  that	  make	  conquest	  of	  the	  losing	  state	  likely	  in	  some	  wars	  –	  and	  less	  so	  in	   others	   –	   are	   varied,	   and	   no	   simple	   rulebook	   that	   can	   be	   applied	   to	   every	   case.	  	  Nevertheless,	   the	   crucial	   conditions	   are	   intuitive,	   and	   include	   factors	   such	   as	   geography	  (the	  size	  of	  the	  weaker	  state’s	  territory,	  and	  perhaps	  the	  location	  of	  key	  cities),	  population,	  the	  ethno-­‐religious-­‐sectarian	  identity	  of	  the	  combatants,	  and	  the	  military	  force	  structure	  of	  the	  stronger	  state.	  	  For	  example,	  if	  war	  erupted	  between	  China	  and	  the	  United	  States	  over	  Taiwan,	   there	  are	  compelling	   reasons	   for	   the	  Chinese	   leadership	   to	  be	  confident	   that	   the	  United	   States	   would	   not	   seek	   to	   conquer	   China.	   	   (“Regime	   change”	   as	   a	  military	   goal	   is	  distinct	   from	   conquest	   and	   is	   discussed	   below.)	   	   China’s	   geographic	   size	   is	   large	   and	   its	  population	   is	   vast,	   making	   it	   virtually	   inconceivable	   that	   U.S.	   conventional	   military	  objectives	   in	   a	   war	   in	   the	   Pacific	   would	   involve	   conquering	   and	   occupying	   China.	  	  Moreover,	  U.S.	  military	  force	  structure	  reflects	  its	  comparative	  advantage	  in	  high-­‐tech	  air-­‐,	  naval-­‐,	  and	  ground-­‐operations,	  not	  the	  mass	  army	  approach	  to	  war	  that	  would	  be	  required	  of	   a	   country	   seeking	   to	   take	   over	   and	   conquer	   a	   major	   power.	   	   At	   the	   other	   extreme,	  although	   Israeli	   leaders	   are	   justifiably	   confident	   in	   the	   superiority	   of	   their	   conventional	  forces	   relative	   to	   their	   neighbors,	   those	   same	   leaders	   undoubtedly	   understand	   that	   any	  unexpected	  conventional	  defeat	  –	  as	  almost	  occurred	  in	  1973	  on	  the	  Golan	  Heights	  –	  would	  immediately	   expose	   Israel	   to	   conquest:	   its	   small	   geographic	   space	   and	   population	   give	  Israel	  little	  strategic	  depth.	  	  For	  Pakistan’s	  leaders,	  the	  case	  is	  less	  clear-­‐cut.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Pakistan	  is	  a	  very	  large	  country	  with	  a	  big	  population;	  it	  is	  roughly	  forty-­‐five	  times	  as	  big	  as	  Israel	  with	  nearly	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twenty-­‐three	   times	   the	   population.	   	   Furthermore,	   Pakistan’s	   leaders	   undoubtedly	  understand	   that	   their	  neighbor	   India	  has	  no	  desire	   to	  conquer	  and	  rule	  over	  180	  million	  Pakistani	  Muslims.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  most	  of	  Pakistan’s	  largest	  cities	  –	  including	  Karachi,	  Lahore,	  Faisalabad,	  Rawalpindi,	  and	  its	  capital	   Islamabad	  –	  are	  within	  approximately	  100	  miles	   of	   the	   border	  with	   India.	   	   Pakistan’s	   leaders	  might	   reasonably	  worry	   that	   a	  major	  conventional	   war	   could	   lead	   India	   to	   seize,	   or	   isolate,	   major	   Pakistani	   cities,	   to	   be	  surrendered	   at	   some	   future	   time	   of	   India’s	   choosing	   –	   unless	   Pakistan	   can	   use	   nuclear	  escalatory	  threats	  to	  prevent	  this.38	  
Vulnerability	  to	  Regime	  Change	  A	   second	   key	   condition	   that	   may	   affect	   the	   propensity	   of	   leaders	   to	   escalate	  conventional	   wars	   –	   rather	   than	   accept	   defeat	   –	   is	   their	   vulnerability	   to	   coups	   or	  revolutions.39	  	  As	  we	  described	  above,	  losing	  power	  often	  results	  in	  terrible	  outcomes	  for	  a	  country’s	  elite.	  	  To	  avoid	  losing	  power	  during	  a	  war,	  however,	  a	  country’s	  leaders	  must	  do	  more	  than	  merely	  deter	  a	  wartime	  enemy	  from	  conquering	  them;	  they	  must	  also	  prevent	  the	   war	   from	   unleashing	   dynamics	   within	   their	   own	   country	   that	   trigger	   a	   coup	   or	  revolution	   –	   during	   or	   after	   the	   conflict.	   	   Countries	  whose	   governments	   face	   substantial	  domestic	   opposition	  will,	   therefore,	   face	   intense	   pressure	   to	   coerce	   an	   end	   to	   hostilities	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  The	  framework	  we	  create	  here	  to	  investigate	  risks	  of	  coercive	  nuclear	  escalation	  is	  intentionally	  simple	  –	  to	  allow	  for	  easy	  application	  –	  but	  should	  not	  obscure	  the	  gradations	  in	  the	  factors	  we	  describe.	   	  For	  example,	  while	   states	   that	   are	   susceptible	   to	   conquest	   are	   expected	   to	   be	  more	   likely	   to	   employ	   coercive	   escalation	  than	  those	  who	  have	  no	  fear	  that	  war	  will	  lead	  to	  loss	  of	  territory,	  some	  states	  face	  the	  prospect	  of	  loss	  of	  key	  territories	  –	  short	  of	  conquest.	  	  A	  major	  Indian	  conventional	  offensive	  might	  exploit	  Pakistan’s	  narrowness	  to	  cut	  the	  major	  lines	  of	  communication	  between	  North	  and	  South.	  	  Similarly,	  if	  China’s	  leaders	  are	  as	  committed	  to	  Taiwan	  as	  their	  public	  positions	  imply,	  they	  may	  see	  a	  war	  that	  leads	  to	  Taiwan’s	  independence	  as	  a	  loss	  which	   –	  while	   far	   less	   than	   conquest	   –	   nevertheless	  means	   the	   loss	   of	   valuable	   territory.	   	   The	   “conquest”	  factor	   is	   a	   useful	   heuristic	   to	   distinguish	   higher	   escalatory	   risks	   from	   lower	   risks,	   but	   such	   categories	   and	  dichotomies	  should	  be	  applied	  with	  care.	  39	  The	   research	  project	  was	   framed	   to	   investigate	   the	   incentives	  of	  weak	   states	  –	   i.e.,	   defined	  as	   those	   that	  expect	   to	   lose	  conventional	  wars	  –	  to	  use	  nuclear	  weapons	  to	  stalemate	  their	  opponents.	  The	  research	  was	  framed	   in	   that	   fashion	   because	   of	   the	   value	   of	   nuclear	   weapons	   as	   a	   stalemating	   device,	   because	   of	   the	  substantial	   history	   of	   states	   relying	   on	   nuclear	   weapons	   to	   compensate	   for	   conventional	   weakness,	   and	  because	  of	  the	  U.S.	  interest	  in	  deterring	  its	  “weak”	  adversaries	  from	  escalating.	  	  However,	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  leaders	  in	  some	  countries	  to	  coups	  and	  revolutions,	  either	  during	  or	  after	  wars,	  and	  the	  escalatory	  pressures	  that	  those	  vulnerabilities	  create	  (to	  coerce	  a	  rapid	  cessation	  of	  hostilities)	  should	  pressure	  both	  weak	  states	  and	  stronger	  ones	  to	  escalate	  to	  rapidly	  end	  a	  conflict	  that	  threatens	  their	  domestic	  power	  at	  home.	  	  In	  other	  words,	   there	   may	   be	   escalatory	   pathways	   that	   would	   lead	   Russia,	   China,	   or	   other	   states	   with	   domestic	  stability	  concerns	  to	  escalate	  a	  war	  with	  a	  weaker	  power.	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rapidly,	  before	  regime	  opponents	  are	  emboldened	  or	  before	  too	  much	  damage	   is	  done	  to	  the	  regime’s	  internal	  security	  forces.	  	   Wars	   tend	   to	   undermine	   governing	   regimes	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   ways.	   	   In	   many	  authoritarian	  regimes,	  popular	  uprisings	  are	  prevented	  by	  “collective	  action”	  problems:	   if	  every	   regime	   opponent	   rebelled	   at	   once,	   they	   could	   overwhelm	   the	   regime’s	   internal	  security	  forces,	  but	  no	  group	  wants	  to	  be	  the	  first:	  it	  would	  be	  slaughtered,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  guarantee	   that	   other	   groups	   or	   individuals	   would	   follow	   their	   lead.	   	   Oppressive	  governments	  exacerbate	  these	  collective	  action	  problems	  by	  using	  spies	  and	  informants	  to	  make	   coordination	   against	   the	   regime	   too	   dangerous.40	  	   If	   a	   government	   suffers	   a	  major	  military	   defeat	   –	   even	   one	   with	   merely	   “limited	   objectives”	   –	   the	   evidence	   of	   disarray	  among	   the	   leadership	   and	   regime	   security	   forces	  may	   embolden	   domestic	   opponents	   to	  rebel.	   	  This	  dynamic	  was	  triggered	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  1991	  Persian	  Gulf	  War:	  the	  signs	  of	  chaos	  within	  Saddam	  Hussein’s	  government,	  and	  the	  appearance	  that	  his	  regime	  was	  on	  its	  last	   legs,	   emboldened	   Shi’ite	   groups,	   principally	   from	   Southern	   Iraq,	   to	   rebel	   against	  Saddam’s	  rule.	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  emboldening	  regime	  opponents,	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  war	  might	  directly	  reduce	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  regime	  to	  defend	  itself	  against	  its	  opponents.	   	  If	  the	  war	  involves	  attacks	   on	   internal	   security	   forces,	   leaders	   may	   become	   unable	   to	   defend	   themselves	  against	  a	  popular	  uprising,	  or	  defend	  themselves	  against	  a	  military	  coup,	  or	  even	  against	  a	  coup	  attempt	  by	  elements	  of	  those	  security	  forces.	   	  Oppressive	  governments	  typically	  put	  their	  most-­‐trusted	  allies	   in	  charge	  of	   leadership	  security	   forces.	   	   If	   those	   forces	  are	  being	  targeted	   and	   destroyed	   –	   and	   hence	   the	   regime’s	   closest	   allies	   are	   being	   killed	   –	   the	  leadership	  may	  face	  intense	  pressure	  to	  compel	  a	  ceasefire	  immediately.	  	  Finally,	  for	  many	  governments,	  the	  greatest	  threat	  to	  regime	  survival	  comes	  from	  the	  country’s	  own	  military.	  	  If	  a	  war	  results	  in	  the	  devastation	  of	  a	  country’s	  military	  forces	  –	  and	  the	  humiliation	  of	  the	  military	  leadership	  –	  the	  risk	  of	  a	  coup	  surges.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  leaders	  must	  compel	  a	  ceasefire	  long	   before	   enemy	   forces	   start	   to	   advance	   on	   their	   capital;	   they	  must	   create	   a	   ceasefire	  before	   domestic	   opponents	   sense	   weakness,	   before	   regime	   security	   elements	   are	   too	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  The	  seminal	  work	  on	  collective	  action	  problems	  is	  Mancur	  Olson,	  The	  Logic	  of	  Collective	  Action:	  Public	  Goods	  
and	  the	  Theory	  of	  Groups	  (Cambridge,	  Harvard	  University,	  1965).	  On	  authoritarian	  regime	  survival	  strategies	  see	  Daniel	  L.	  Byman	  and	  Jennifer	  M.	  Lind,	  “Pyongyang’s	  Survival	  Strategy:	  Tools	  of	  Authoritarian	  Control	   in	  North	  Korea,”	  International	  Security,	  Vol.	  35,	  no.	  1	  (Summer	  2010):	  44-­‐74.	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degraded,	   and	   before	   its	   military	   becomes	   too	   demoralized	   and	   angry	   at	   the	   political	  leadership.	  The	   implication	  for	  regimes	  that	   face	  considerable	   internal	  opposition	   is	  clear:	   if	  a	  war	  begins	  to	  go	  badly,	   find	  a	  way	  to	  create	  a	  battlefield	  stalemate	   immediately	  –	  or	   face	  the	  prospects	  of	  a	  revolution	  or	  coup.	   	  The	  implication	  for	  countries	  that	  might	  face	  weak	  regimes	  in	  war	  is	  equally	   important:	  adopting	  even	  a	  “limited	  aims”	  war	  plan	  may	  not	  be	  sufficient	  to	  prevent	  escalation.	  	  Inflicting	  a	  major	  conventional	  defeat	  on	  the	  enemy	  –	  like	  the	   one	   inflicted	   on	   Iraq	   in	   1991,	   and	   the	   one	   the	  United	   States	  would	   seek	   to	   inflict	   in	  almost	  any	  limited	  war	  –	  may	  cross	  the	  enemy’s	  escalatory	  red	  line.	  	  
Blinding	  and	  Disarming	  Military	  Operations	  The	   third	   key	   factor	   that	   may	   make	   leaders	   more	   inclined	   to	   employ	   nuclear	  weapons	  coercively	  stems	  from	  the	  style	  of	  war	  waged	  by	  their	  opponents.	   	  If	  leaders	  are	  driven	   to	   escalate	   by	   fear	   of	   conquest	   or	   post-­‐war	   regime	   change,	   then	   certain	   kinds	   of	  military	  operations	  are	   likely	   to	  exacerbate	   that	   fear.	   	  Specifically,	  operations	   that	  aim	  to	  blind	   enemy	   command	   and	   control,	   directly	   target	   political	   leaders	   and	   regime	   security	  elements,	   or	   degrade	   strategic	   deterrent	   forces	   will	   intensify	   adversary	   incentives	   to	  escalate.	  	  	  Conventional	   war	   has	   changed	   dramatically	   over	   the	   past	   three	   decades	   as	  computers	  have	  become	  fully	  integrated	  into	  every	  facet	  of	  warfare.	  	  The	  computerization	  of	   weapons	   and	   warfare	   has	   changed	   nearly	   every	   aspect	   of	   combat:	   e.g.,	   command,	  communications,	  reconnaissance,	  navigation,	  and	  the	  precision	  with	  which	  weapons	  can	  be	  delivered	   against	   targets.	   	   Increasingly,	  military	   forces	   derive	   combat	   effectiveness	   from	  their	  ability	  to	   integrate	   information	  from	  multiple	  sources,	  make	  effective	  decisions,	  and	  coordinate	   the	   actions	   of	   widely	   dispersed	   units.	   	   Thus,	   the	   battlefield	   payoffs	   from	  disrupting	  an	  adversary’s	  command	  and	  control	   system	  –	   i.e.,	   severing	   the	   links	  between	  sensors	   and	   commanders	   and	   forces,	   and	   destroying	   command	   sites	   themselves	   –	   have	  become	  enormous.	  	  Not	  surprisingly,	  powerful	  states	  like	  the	  United	  States	  have	  made	  such	  operations	  the	  centerpiece	  of	  their	  way	  of	  war.	  	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  although	  this	  style	  of	  warfare	  can	  produce	  one-­‐sided	  battlefield	  outcomes,	  it	  is	  also	  highly	  escalatory.	  
	   	   	  	  
	  
36	  
Over	  the	  past	  twenty	  years,	  every	  major	  U.S.	  military	  operation	  has	  begun	  with	  an	  intense	  effort	  to	  destroy	  the	  enemy’s	  command	  and	  control.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  first	  five	  days	  of	  U.S.	  air	  operations	  in	  the	  1991	  Persian	  Gulf	  War	  focused	  on	  degrading	  the	  Iraqi	  military’s	  central	  nervous	  system,	  rather	  than	  hacking	  off	  its	  limbs.	  	  More	  than	  a	  thousand	  airstrikes	  targeted	   Iraqi	   surface-­‐to-­‐air	   radars	   and	   missile	   systems	   (to	   allow	   the	   United	   States	  unfettered	   access	   to	   Iraqi	   airspace),	   command	   posts,	   electricity,	   communications,	   and	  organs	   of	   government	   control	   –	   all	   aimed	   at	   denying	   the	   Iraqi	   leadership	   “situational	  awareness”	   and	   preventing	   it	   from	   coordinating	   military	   forces	   in	   the	   field.41	  	   Of	   these	  strikes,	  nearly	  two	  hundred	  were	  launched	  against	  Iraq’s	  leadership	  on	  the	  first	  night	  of	  the	  air	   war	   –	   representing	   an	   intense	   effort	   to	   kill	   the	   senior	   members	   in	   Saddam’s	  government.42	  	  The	  air	  war	  against	  Serbia	  (1999)	  and	  during	  the	  Iraq	  War	  (2003)	  followed	  a	  similar	  pattern.43	  	  Even	  the	  wars	  against	  enemies	  with	  more	  rudimentary	  command	  and	  controls	   systems	   –	   the	   Taliban	   leaders	   of	   Afghanistan	   (2001)	   and	   the	   brief	   campaign	  against	  Libya	  (2011)	  –	  began	  with	  attacks	  on	  the	  leadership	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  command	  and	  control	  their	  defense	  forces.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Data	  derived	  from	  Gulf	  War	  Air	  Power	  Survey,	  Vol.	  V,	  Table	  178.	  	  Here	  we	  count	  each	  strike	  sortie	  as	  a	  single	  “strike.”	   	   The	   sorties	   reported	   here	   refer	   to	   strikes	   on	   the	   categories	   of	   “C3,”	   “electricity,”	   “government	  control,”	  and	  “SAM,”	  as	  reported	  in	  GWAPS.	  	  The	  1,002	  sorties	  over	  five	  days	  represents	  26%	  of	  all	  Coalition	  strike	  sorties	  in	  that	  time	  period;	  on	  the	  first	  day	  alone,	  31%	  of	  the	  strikes	  on	  Iraq	  were	  directed	  against	  these	  target	  categories.	   	  Evidence	  suggests	   that	   the	  effort	   to	  destroy	  Iraqi	  command	  and	  control	   in	  1991	  was	  not	  nearly	   as	   effective	   as	   is	   often	   suggested,	   but	   the	   1991	   air	  war	  was	   fought	  with	   very	   few	   precision	   guided	  munitions.	  	  The	  1991	  air	  campaign	  charted	  the	  direction	  for	  future	  U.S.	  air	  wars.	  	  On	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  1991	  air	  war	  campaign,	  see	  Daryl	  G.	  Press,	  “The	  Myth	  of	  Airpower	  in	  the	  Persian	  Gulf	  War	  and	  the	  Future	  of	  Warfare,”	  International	  Security,	  Vol.	  26,	  No.	  2	  (Fall	  2001),	  pp.	  5-­‐44;	  and	  Daryl	  G.	  Press,	  “Lessons	  from	  Ground	  Combat	  in	  the	  Gulf:	  The	  Impact	  of	  Training	  and	  Technology,”	  International	  Security,	  Vol.	  22,	  No.	  2	  (Fall1997),	  137-­‐146.	  42	  On	   the	   first	   day	   of	   the	   1991	   air	   war,	   there	   were	   193	   strikes	   against	   Iraqi	   leadership	   targets,	   in	   which	  category	  we	  include	  strikes	  on	  “C3”	  and	  “Government	  Control”	  targets.	  Data	  derived	  from	  GWAPS,	  V5,	  Table	  178.	   	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  purpose	  was	  to	  kill	  Saddam	  Hussein	  and	  other	  senior	  leaders.	   	   In	  an	  initial	  briefing	  on	  the	  air	  war	  plan,	  U.S.	  military	  planners	   illustrated	  the	  U.S.	  air	  war	  plan	  as	  a	  “bulls	  eye”	  with	  the	  words	   “Saddam	   Hussein”	   in	   the	   center.	   	   Concerns	   that	   this	   depiction	   might	   suggest	   that	   the	   USAF	   was	  violating	  restrictions	  against	  assassination	   led	  the	  war	  planners	   to	  replace	  the	  words	  “Saddam	  Hussein”	  on	  their	  briefing	  slides	  with	  the	  word	  “Leadership.”	  43	  In	   the	   2003	   war,	   the	   military	   efforts	   against	   leadership	   sites	   were	   even	   more	   intense	   than	   in	   1991.	  	  Whereas	   the	  1991	  air	  war	   lasted	  43	  days,	  whereas	   the	  high-­‐intensity	   air	  operations	   in	  2003	  only	   spanned	  roughly	   20	   days	   –	   from	  March	   19th	   until	   April	   9th	  when	  Baghdad	   fell.	   	   In	   that	   shortened	   time,	  U.S.	   aircraft	  struck	  1,799	  targets	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  “suppression	  of	  Iraqi	  regime’s	  ability	  to	  command	  Iraqi	  forces	  and	  govern	   State.”	   	   Furthermore,	   unlike	   in	   1991,	   virtually	   all	   these	   strikes	   used	   precision-­‐guided	   munitions.	  	  “Operation	  Iraqi	  Freedom	  –	  By	  the	  Numbers,”	  Assessment	  and	  Analysis	  Division,	  USCENTAF,	  20	  April	  2003,	  pp.	  4-­‐5.	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In	   addition	   to	  blinding	  adversaries,	   sophisticated	  militaries	   like	   that	  of	   the	  United	  States	   have	   a	   powerful	   proclivity	   to	   target	   the	   most	   lethal	   weapons	   systems	   of	   their	  enemies,	   including	   weapons	   of	   mass	   destruction.	   	   From	   an	   operational	   standpoint,	   this	  makes	   good	   sense	   –	   during	   a	   war	   it	   seems	   logical	   to	   degrade	   an	   enemy’s	   most	   lethal	  weapons.	   	   However,	   attacks	   on	   an	   adversary’s	   WMD	   sites	   and	   delivery	   systems	   also	  inherently	   open	   the	   door	   for	   follow-­‐on	   operations	   to	   overthrow	   those	   regimes.	   	   Stated	  differently,	   if	   an	   enemy’s	   weapons	   of	   mass	   destruction	   are	   the	   ultimate	   deterrent	   and	  guarantee	   of	   its	   regime	   survival,	   then	   efforts	   to	   destroy	   those	   weapons	   will	   pose	   an	  existential	   threat	   –	   forcing	   it	   to	   escalate	   to	   coerce	   an	   end	   to	   those	   attacks.	   	  Attacking	   an	  enemy’s	  strategic	  deterrent	  assets	  is,	  therefore,	  highly	  escalatory.	  In	  recent	  wars,	  the	  United	  States	  has	  often	  sought	  to	  destroy	  the	  enemy’s	  strategic	  assets.	   	   In	   1991,	   the	   U.S.	   air	   campaign	   included	   intense	   attacks	   on	   Iraqi	  WMD	   sites	   and	  suspected	  delivery	  systems.	  	  More	  than	  one	  hundred	  WMD-­‐related	  targets	  were	  struck	  on	  the	   first	  night	  alone,	   and	  nearly	   six	  hundred	  WMD	  targets	  were	  attacked	  during	   the	   first	  five	   days	   of	   the	   campaign	   –	   comprising	   15%	   of	   all	   U.S.	   strikes.44	  	   The	   United	   States	  prioritized	  potential	  WMD	  targets	  in	  the	  2003	  war	  against	  Iraq	  as	  well;	  the	  air	  war	  plan	  for	  Operation	   Iraqi	   Freedom	   identified	   1,840	   targets	   associated	   with	   delivery	   systems	   for	  Iraq’s	  (essentially	  nonexistent)	  WMD	  program.45	  The	  effective	  –	  but	  potentially	  escalatory	  –	  style	  of	  conventional	  warfare	  is	  likely	  to	  remain	   central	   to	   U.S.	   war	   plans	   in	   the	   coming	   decades,	   and	   it	   is	   unlikely	   to	   be	   simply	  shelved	   for	   conflict	   scenarios	   involving	   nuclear-­‐armed	   enemies.	   	   For	   example,	   the	   over-­‐arching	  U.S.	  concept	  for	  military	  operations	  against	  China	  in	  the	  coming	  decades	  –	  “AirSea	  Battle”	  –	  calls	  for	  air	  and	  missile	  strikes	  against	  large	  numbers	  of	  radars,	  communications	  nodes,	   and	   other	   command	   and	   control	   targets	   across	   the	   Chinese	   homeland. 46	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Includes	   strikes	   on	   targets	   identified	   as	   “NBC”	   [nuclear,	   biological,	   chemical]	   and	   strikes	   on	   targets	  associated	  with	  SCUD	  missiles.	   	  The	  numbers	  here	  only	  cover	  the	  first	  five	  days	  of	  the	  air	  war	  and	  hence	  do	  not	  include	  air	  attacks	  as	  part	  of	  the	  “SCUD	  hunt”	  later	  in	  the	  war	  –	  which	  arguably	  were	  intended	  to	  suppress	  Iraq’s	   punitive	   conventional	  missile	   strikes	   on	   Israel	   and	   Saudi	   Arabia	   rather	   than	   destroy	  WMD	   delivery	  systems.	  	  The	  data	  is	  from	  GWAPS,	  Vol.	  5,	  Table	  178.	  45	  This	  figure	  counts	  the	  targets	  in	  the	  “WD”	  target	  sets	  in	  the	  “Joint	  Integrated	  Prioritized	  Target	  List,”	  832	  of	  which	   were	   eventually	   struck.	   	   	   “Operation	   Iraqi	   Freedom	   –	   By	   the	   Numbers,”	   Assessment	   and	   Analysis	  Division,	  USCENTAF,	  20	  April	  2003,	  pp.	  4-­‐5.	  46	  Andrew	  Krepinevich,	  et	  al.	  Meeting	  the	  Anti-­‐access	  and	  Area-­‐denial	  Challenge.	  Washington,	  D.C.:	  Center	  for	  Strategic	  and	  Budgetary	  Assessments,	  2003;	  Michael	  McDevitt,	  “The	  evolving	  maritime	  security	  environment	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Furthermore,	  recent	  U.S.	  conventional	  operations	  and	  U.S.	  air	  war	  doctrine	  suggest	  that	  if	  war	   erupted	   in	   Korea,	   the	   U.S.-­‐ROK	   Combined	   Forces	   Command	   would	   seek	   to	   rapidly	  degrade	   North	   Korean	   command	   and	   control	   and	   strategic	   weapon	   systems.	   There	   is	   a	  powerful	  logic	  for	  attacking	  enemy	  command	  and	  control	  –	  such	  attacks	  are	  a	  key	  element	  of	  the	  one-­‐sided	  conventional	  victories	  that	  the	  U.S.	  has	  enjoyed	  for	  the	  past	  two	  decades.	  	  There	   is	   also	   a	   powerful	   logic	   for	   rapidly	   degrading	   those	   enemy	   weapon	   systems	   that	  could	  cause	  extreme	  damage	  to	  U.S.	  allies,	  forces,	  and	  the	  U.S.	  homeland.	  	  But	  waging	  war	  in	  this	   fashion	   –	   blinding	   and	  disarming	   the	   enemy,	  while	   destroying	   his	   leadership	   sites	   –	  places	  great	  pressure	  on	  enemy	  leaders	  to	  escalate	  to	  force	  such	  attacks	  to	  stop.	  In	  sum,	  strong	  states	  with	  sophisticated	  militaries	  like	  the	  United	  States	  will	  almost	  inevitably	   target	  weaker	   states’	   command	   and	   control	   systems,	   leadership,	   and	   strategic	  assets	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  a	  conventional	  conflict.	  	  This	  compounds	  the	  adversary’s	  fear	  of	  not	  surviving	   the	   conflict,	   thus	   making	   nuclear	   escalation	   as	   a	   means	   of	   forestalling	   defeat	  more	  likely.	  
Escalation	  Risks	  in	  Potential	  Conventional	  Conflicts	  Table	   1	   summarizes	   these	   dangers	   in	   the	   context	   of	   several	   wars	   that	   could	  plausibly	   occur	   in	   the	   coming	   years.	   	   The	   column	   on	   the	   far	   right	   aggregates	   the	   three	  worrisome	   conditions	   –	   conquest,	   regime	   vulnerability,	   and	   the	   propensity	   of	   the	  combatants	  to	  wage	  conventional	  war	  by	  blinding	  and	  disarming	  the	  enemy	  –	  and	  indicates	  the	  resulting	  escalatory	  risks	  if	  conventional	  war	  were	  to	  occur.	  	  The	  darker	  shade	  in	  that	  far-­‐right	   column	   indicates	   that	   all	   three	   worrisome	   conditions	   are	   present;	   the	   lighter	  shade	   means	   that	   one	   or	   two	   of	   the	   dangerous	   conditions	   would	   would	   exist	   during	   a	  conventional	  war.	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  in	  East	  Asia:	  Implications	  for	  the	  US-­‐Japan	  alliance,”	  Honolulu,	  HI:	  CSIS	  Pacific	  Forum.	  May	  31,	  2012;	  Thomas	  P.M.	  Barnett,	  “Big-­‐War	  thinking	  in	  a	  small-­‐war	  era:	  The	  rise	  of	  the	  Air-­‐Sea	  Battle	  concept,”	  China	  Security	  18	  (2010).	  On	  the	  escalatory	  risks	  of	  Air	  Sea	  Battle,	  see	  Raoul	  Heinrichs,	  “America’s	  dangerous	  battle	  plan,”	  The	  
Diplomat,	   August	   17,	   2011;	   Greg	   Jaffe,	   “U.S.	   model	   for	   a	   future	   war	   fans	   tension	   with	   China	   and	   inside	  Pentagon,”	  Washington	  Post,	  August	  1,	  2012;	  “Air-­‐Sea	  battle	  plan	  renews	  old	  hostility,”	  Global	  Times	  (China),	  November	  14,	  2011.	  	  Many	  analysts	  and	  U.S.	  officials	  would	  argue	  that	  these	  operations	  are	  a	  vital	  necessity;	  without	   striking	   those	   targets,	  moving	   ships	   into	   the	  Western	  Pacific	   or	   flying	   aircraft	   from	   regional	  bases	  might	  be	  impossible.	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Table	  1.	  	  Nuclear	  Escalation	  Risks	  in	  Potential	  Conventional	  Wars	  













U.S./ROK	  vs.	  N.	  Korea	  
(War	  on	  peninsula)	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   3	  
U.S.	  vs.	  China	  
(Taiwan)	   Yes	   No/Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   2.5
47	  
U.S.	  vs.	  China	  
(Islands	  dispute)	   Yes	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   2	  
U.S.	  vs.	  Iran	  
(Strait	  of	  Hormuz)	   Yes	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   2
48	  
India	  vs.	  Pakistan	  
(Major	  war)	   Yes	   No/Yes	   Yes	   No	   1.5
49	  
Note:	  Table	  depicts	  escalatory	  incentives	  for	  the	  country	  whose	  name	  is	  underlined.	  	   Several	   of	   the	   implications	   from	   Table	   1	   are	   striking.	   	   First,	   although	   it	   is	  widely	  appreciated	  within	   the	  U.S.	  national	   security	   community	   that	   a	  major	  war	  between	   India	  and	  Pakistan	  would	   entail	   dangerous	   escalatory	   risks	   –	   a	   judgment	  we	   share	   –	   the	   logic	  developed	   in	   this	   paper	   and	   summarized	   in	   Table	   1	   suggests	   that	   several	   plausible	   U.S.	  regional	   wars	   are	   even	   more	   prone	   to	   escalation.	   	   The	   likelihood	   of	   escalation	   seems	  greatest	  on	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula:	   the	  Pyongyang	  government	  has	  every	  reason	  to	  expect	  that	  a	  major	  military	  defeat	  equals	   regime	  change,	  with	  calamitous	  consequences	   for	   the	  existing	  leadership.	  	  Regime	  change	  could	  occur	  as	  a	  result	  of	  intentional	  U.S.	  /	  ROK	  policy	  	  	  –	   i.e.,	   if	   leaders	   in	   Washington	   and	   Seoul	   choose	   “regime	   change”	   as	   the	   war’s	   desired	  endstate.	  	  But	  the	  Pyongyang	  government	  might	  fall	  even	  if	  the	  U.S.	  and	  ROK	  pursue	  limited	  objectives:	   the	   damage	   inflicted	   on	   the	  North	  Korean	  military	   and	   security	   services	  may	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  A	  war	   over	   Taiwan	  would	   not	  make	   leaders	   in	   Beijing	   fear	   “conquest”	   in	   the	   narrow	   sense	   of	   the	   term.	  However,	  as	  we	  discussed	  above,	  conquest	  should	  not	  be	  conceived	  in	  a	  strictly	  binary	  sense	  (i.e.,	  conquered	  or	   not).	   	   The	   loss	   of	   some	   highly	   valued	   territory,	  while	   not	   as	   bad	   as	   complete	   conquest	   and	   occupation,	  might	  entail	  a	  major	  loss	  to	  the	  core	  interests	  of	  a	  state.	   	   If	  Chinese	  leaders	  are	  to	  be	  believed	  that	  they	  see	  Taiwan	  as	  an	  inseparable	  part	  of	  China,	  and	  especially	  if	  the	  people	  of	  China	  feel	  the	  same,	  it	  may	  be	  too	  costly	  to	  leaders	  in	  Beijing	  to	  accept	  defeat	  in	  a	  war	  over	  Taiwan,	  especially	  if	  the	  consequences	  might	  be	  Taiwanese	  independence.	  	  	  48	  Iran	  is	  not	  believed	  to	  have	  nuclear	  weapons.	  This	  row	  indicates	  the	  escalatory	  risks	  in	  a	  future	  war	  in	  the	  Strait	  of	  Hormuz	  if	  Iran	  has	  subsequently	  acquired	  nuclear	  weapons.	  49	  As	  described	  above	   in	   the	   text,	   the	   risk	  of	   outright	   conquest	  of	  Pakistan	  by	   India	   appears	   low;	  however,	  most	   key	   Pakistani	   cities	   are	   very	   close	   to	   the	   Indian	   border,	   so	   Pakistan’s	   leaders	   may	   reasonably	   fear	  limited	   territorial	   incursions	   by	   India	   that	   would	   isolate	   critical	   Pakistani	   population	   centers.	   	   This	   is	  reflected	  in	  the	  “No/Yes”	  value	  under	  the	  “Conquest	  plausible?”	  column.	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sufficiently	  weaken	  the	  regime	  and	  trigger	  a	  coup	  or	  revolution.	  	  Furthermore,	  CFC	  military	  operations	   will	   likely	   seek	   to	   blind	   the	   North	   Korean	   command	   and	   control,	   destroy	  leadership	  sites,	  and	  perhaps	  degrade	  their	  strategic	  weapons.	  	  If	  war	  erupts	  on	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula,	  preventing	  escalation	  will	  be	  a	  very	  difficult	  challenge.	  Second,	  a	  conventional	  conflict	  in	  maritime	  East	  Asia	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  China	   may	   entail	   far	   greater	   nuclear	   escalation	   risks	   than	   is	   commonly	   recognized.	  	  Because	   the	  conquest	  of	  China	   is	  not	  plausible,	  many	  analysts	  assume	  that	   the	  escalation	  risks	   in	   a	   U.S.-­‐China	   clash	   are	   substantially	   muted.	   	   But	   that	   optimistic	   assumption	  overlooks	  two	  critical	   facts,	  which	  are	  highlighted	  in	  Table	  1.	   	  Namely,	  China’s	   leadership	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  survive	  the	  political	  repercussion	  of	  suffering	  a	  humiliating	  conventional	  military	   defeat	   at	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   United	   States,	   and	   that	   the	   U.S.	   style	   of	   conventional	  operations	  –	  including	  large	  numbers	  of	  strikes	  on	  the	  Chinese	  mainland	  to	  blind	  Chinese	  sensors	   and	   degrade	   military	   command	   and	   control	   –	   may	   exacerbate	   these	   escalatory	  risks.	  	  	  Finally,	  Table	  1	  highlights	  what	  might	  be	   the	  greatest	  danger	  associated	  with	   Iran	  acquiring	  nuclear	  weapons.	   	  Even	   if	   Iran	   is	  deterrable	  –	  and	  hence	  does	  not	  seek	  nuclear	  war	  against	  the	  United	  States	  or	  U.S.	  allies	  –	  the	  dynamics	  of	  conventional	  operations	  in	  the	  Persian	  Gulf	  may	  force	  the	  hand	  of	  leaders	  in	  Tehran.	  	  Specifically,	  operating	  naval	  forces	  in	  the	  constrained	  waters	  of	  the	  Persian	  Gulf	  during	  a	  war	  might	  compel	  the	  United	  States	  to	  greatly	  degrade	   Iran’s	  air	  defense	  network,	  surface	  search	  radars,	  and	  military	  command	  and	  control	  –	  and	  there	  would	  be	  powerful	  pressures	  on	  the	  United	  States	  to	  also	  degrade	  the	  systems	   that	  could	  deliver	   Iran’s	  nuclear	  weapons.	   	   In	   the	  context	  of	  decades	  of	  U.S.-­‐Iranian	  hostility,	   and	   repeated	  U.S.	   statements	  about	   the	  desirability	  of	   regime	  change	   in	  Tehran,	  the	  pressure	  on	  an	  Iranian	  government	  to	  coerce	  a	  rapid	  end	  to	  hostilities	  would	  likely	  be	   intense.	   	  Nuclear	  escalation	  –	  directed	  against	  U.S.	   facilities	   in	   the	  region,	  or	   the	  facilities	  or	  cities	  of	  U.S.	  regional	  allies	  –	  would	  be	  one	  of	  Iran’s	  main	  options.50	  	  In	  sum,	  there	  is	  a	  common	  view	  within	  the	  U.S.	  national	  security	  community	  that	  the	  intentional	   use	   of	   nuclear	   weapons	   by	   a	   state	   actor	   against	   the	   United	   States	   is	   very	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  The	  logic	  of	  Iranian	  nuclear	  escalation,	  and	  Tehran’s	  escalatory	  options,	  would	  be	  directly	  analogous	  to	  North	  Korea’s	  escalatory	  logic	  and	  options	  during	  a	  conventional	  war,	  as	  described	  above	  (pp.	  13-­‐26).	  	  In	  the	  Iran	  case,	  potential	  targets	  for	  an	  initial	  coercive	  escalatory	  strike	  might	  include	  a	  U.S.	  military	  bases	  (e.g.,	  Al	  Udeid,	  or	  NSA	  Bahrain)	  or	  a	  city	  in	  a	  regional	  ally.	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unlikely.	   	   The	   logic	   developed	   in	   this	   study	   raises	   profound	   questions	   about	   that	   view.	  	  Since	   the	   dawn	   of	   the	   nuclear	   age,	   countries	   and	   alliances	   that	   faced	   overwhelming	  conventional	  adversaries	  have	  relied	  on	  nuclear	  weapons,	  and	  planned	  to	  use	  them	  during	  war,	   to	   stalemate	   their	   foes.	   	   During	   the	   Cold	   War	   the	   United	   States	   and	   NATO	   felt	  conventionally	  overmatched	  and	  planned	  to	  escalate	  coercively	  stalemate	  a	  war	  in	  Europe;	  today	   it	   is	   North	   Korea,	   and	   China,	   and	   Pakistan,	   and	   Iran,	   who	   are	   overmatched.	   	   The	  challenge	  that	  the	  United	  States	  military	  faces	  today	  –	  devising	  ways	  to	  wage	  conventional	  wars	  and	  defeat	  U.S.	  enemies	  without	   forcing	  them	  to	  escalate	  –	  was	  never	  solved	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  Soviet	  proposals	  for	  a	  mutual	  “no	  first	  use”	  pledge	  fell	  on	  deaf	  ears	  because	  nuclear	  escalation	  seemed	  to	  be	  NATO’s	  only	  means	  of	  thwarting	  a	  conventional	   invasion	  by	   the	  Warsaw	   Pact.	   	   Devising	   concepts	   for	   winning	   wars	   without	   triggering	   adversary	  escalation	   should	   be	   a	   top	   priority	   for	   U.S.	   conventional	   war	   planners;	   fashioning	   a	  conventional	   and	   nuclear	   force	   structure	   that	   is	   well	   suited	   for	   deterring	   adversary	  wartime	  escalation	  should	  be	  a	  top	  priority	  for	  U.S.	  force	  structure	  planners.	  
COUNTERARGUMENTS	  Critics	  might	   concede	   that	   conventional	  wars	   between	   nuclear-­‐armed	   adversaries	  would	   be	   highly	   escalatory,	   yet	   counter	   that	   such	  wars	   are	   unlikely	   to	   occur	   in	   the	   first	  place.	   	   In	  fact,	  critics	  might	  say,	  the	  arguments	  that	  we	  present	  here	  about	  the	  dangers	  of	  wartime	  escalation	  are	  exactly	  the	  reason	  that	  these	  conventional	  wars	  will	  not	  occur.	  	  As	  Kenneth	  Waltz	   argues,	   nuclear	  weapons	   do	   not	  merely	   deter	   nuclear	   attacks;	   they	   deter	  conventional	   attacks	   as	   well.	   	   As	   he	   explains,	   launching	   a	   major	   conventional	   offensive	  against	   a	   nuclear-­‐armed	   state	  would	   be	   foolhardy;	   yet,	   launching	   a	   limited	   conventional	  attack	  would	  be	  equally	  senseless	  –	  as	  the	  small	  potential	  gains	  would	  be	  trivial	  compared	  to	  any	  residual	  risk	  of	  escalation.	  51	  	  In	  short,	  critics	  might	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  precisely	  because	  our	  arguments	  about	  the	  danger	  of	  escalation	  are	  correct	  that	  these	  wars	  will	  not	  happen.	  The	   lack	  of	  high-­‐intensity	  conventional	  war	  between	  two	  nuclear	  weapon	  states	   is	  evidence	  on	  the	  side	  of	  Waltz,	  but	   there	   is	  worrisome	  evidence,	  as	  well.	   	  First,	   if	  Waltz	   is	  right	   that	   the	   risk	   of	   nuclear	   escalation	   will	   reliably	   deter	   conventional	   attacks,	   then	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  For	  example,	  see	  Kenneth	  N.	  Waltz	  and	  Scott	  D.	  Sagan,	  The	  Spread	  of	  Nuclear	  Weapons:	  A	  Debate	  Renewed	  (New	  York:	  Norton,	  2003).	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conventional	  attacks	  on	  nuclear-­‐armed	  countries	  should	  not	  occur	  –	  yet	  they	  do.	  	  In	  some	  cases	   these	   were	   highly	   limited	   conventional	   operations,	   in	   locations	   whose	   geography	  limited	  the	  fighting	  (e.g.,	  Kargil	  1999;	  Falklands	  1982).52	  	  But	  on	  other	  occasions,	  countries	  have	   launched	  major	   conventional	  military	  operations	   that	   inflicted	  substantial	   losses	  on	  nuclear-­‐armed	   adversaries,	   or	   which	   threatened	   their	   vital	   interests.	   	   In	   1950	   China	  launched	  a	  major	  land	  attack	  against	  U.S.	  and	  allied	  forces	  on	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula,	  dealing	  the	   United	   States	   a	   major	   defeat,	   denying	   the	   United	   States	   victory	   on	   the	   Korean	  Peninsula,	   and	   killing	   thousands	   of	   U.S.	   military	   personnel.	   	   Whatever	   calculations	   led	  China’s	   leaders	   to	   believe	   they	   could	   inflict	   such	   a	   serious	   defeat	   on	   the	   United	   States	  without	   prohibitive	   risk	   of	   nuclear	   escalation	   surely	   does	   not	   resemble	   the	   line	   of	  reasoning	  –	  and	  the	  overwhelming	  caution	  –	  that	  Waltz	  expects	  to	  observe	  in	  states	  facing	  nuclear-­‐armed	  enemies.	  Further,	  the	  Syrian	  attack	  on	  the	  Golan	  Heights	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  1973	  Yom	  Kippur	  War	  reflects	  a	  level	  of	  risk	  acceptance	  that	  does	  not	  jibe	  well	  with	  Waltz’s	  arguments.	  	  On	  October	  6,	  five	  divisions	  of	  Syrian	  ground	  forces	  launched	  a	  major	  surprise	  attack	  on	  Israeli	  defenses	   along	   the	   Golan	   Heights.	   	   The	   Syrian	   ground	   forces	   nearly	   broke	   through	   the	  Israeli	   line;	   at	   the	  worst	  moment	   for	   Israel,	   roughly	   a	   dozen	   tanks	   stood	   in	   front	   of	   the	  Syrian	  Army	  –	  and	  there	  were	  no	  additional	  Israeli	  reserves	  between	  the	  Golan	  Heights	  and	  Tel	  Aviv.	  	  (Some	  accounts	  of	  the	  war	  claim	  that	  Israel	  took	  steps	  during	  the	  war	  to	  prepare	  its	  nuclear	  arsenal	  in	  case	  the	  Syrian	  Army	  broke	  through.)	  	  Syria	  was	  fortunate:	  its	  attack	  on	  the	  Golan	  Heights	  failed.	  	  But	  their	  decision	  process	  does	  not	  match	  the	  level	  of	  caution	  one	  will	   require	   if	   conventional	  wars	   against	   nuclear-­‐armed	   states	   are	   to	   be	   banished.53	  	  More	  recently,	   the	  apparent	  North	  Korean	  sinking	  of	  a	  South	  Korean	  warship	   in	  2010,	  or	  the	   North’s	   shelling	   of	   Yeonpyeong	   Island	   near	   Seoul,	   could	   have	   led	   to	   a	   substantial	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  The	   Kargil	   conflict	   in	   1999	   involved	   small	   units	   fighting	   to	   control	   a	   handful	   of	   mountain	   peaks	   in	   the	  Kashmir	   region.	   	   The	   high	   altitude	   and	   mountainous	   terrain	   greatly	   limited	   the	   scale	   of	   conventional	  operations.	   	   The	   Falklands	   war	   involved	   Argentina’s	   attempt	   to	   take	   control	   of	   the	   disputed	   Falklands	   /	  Malvinas	  islands.	  	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  fighting,	  on	  the	  small,	  remote	  Islands	  in	  the	  South	  Atlantic,	  and	  in	  the	  sea	  and	  are	  around	  them,	  greatly	  limited	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  fighting.	  	  Note,	  however,	  that	  according	  to	  Waltz’s	  logic,	  neither	  the	  Argentinians	  nor	  the	  Pakistanis	  should	  have	  attacked:	  the	  risk	  of	  escalation	  was	  low,	  but	  so	  were	  the	  potential	  gains	  from	  victory.	  	  53	  For	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  Syrian	  offensive	  and	  the	  desperate	  fighting	  on	  the	  Golan	  Heights,	  see	  Trevor	  N.	  Dupuy,	  Elusive	  Victory:	  The	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  Wars,	  1947-­‐74.	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conventional	   response	   by	   Seoul	   –	   triggering	   war.54	  	   Waltz’s	   view	   may	   correctly	   explain	  Seoul’s	   reluctance	   to	   respond	   to	   those	   attacks	   with	   force;	   but	   it	   does	   not	   explain	  Pyongyang’s	  willingness	  to	  instigate	  violence	  and	  keep	  walking	  along	  the	  edge	  of	  war.	  More	  broadly,	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  risk	  of	  catastrophe	  will	  reliably	  deter	  conventional	  wars	  seems	  to	  contradict	  much	  of	  history.	  	  For	  most	  of	  history,	  starting	  a	  war	  meant	  risking	  catastrophe.	  	  Leaders	  who	  lost	  surrendered	  not	  merely	  their	  crowns,	  but	  also	  their	  heads.	  	  In	  the	  era	  of	  dynastic	  succession,	  defeat	  often	  meant	  that	  one’s	  children	  were	  killed	  as	  well	  –	  to	  prevent	  future	  claims	  to	  rule.	  	  Throughout	  history,	  those	  who	  led	  rebellions	  –	  against	  ancient	   empires,	   colonial	   powers,	   or	   even	   against	  modern	   occupiers	   –	   usually	   paid	  with	  their	   lives	   (and	   often	   died	   gruesomely).	   	   And	   the	   populations	   on	   whose	   behalf	   the	  insurgents	   rebelled	   were	   sometimes	   slaughtered,	   to	   teach	   others	   not	   to	   emulate	   their	  disloyalty.	  	  In	  more	  modern	  times,	  the	  Japanese	  who	  planned	  Pearl	  Harbor	  understood	  that	  they	  were	  attacking	  a	  country	  with	  ten	  times	  their	  economic	  power,	  and	  they	  understood	  that	   if	   the	  war	  went	   badly	   it	   meant	   catastrophe	   for	   themselves	   and	   Japan.	   	   (They	  were	  right.)	  	  But	  despite	  those	  risks,	  the	  Japanese	  attacked.	  	  Germany’s	  leaders	  understood	  that	  they	  were	  risking	  personal	  and	  national	  calamity	  when	  they	  invaded	  France,	  and	  especially	  when	  they	  invaded	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  But	  they	  attacked	  anyway.	  	  In	  1980	  Saddam	  Hussein	  invaded	  Iran,	  a	  country	  with	  three	  times	  Iraq’s	  population	  –	  a	  gamble	  that	  nearly	  led	  to	  his	  overthrow	   and	   death.	   	   If	   it	   were	   true	   that	   leaders	   do	   not	   start	   conventional	  wars	   if	   the	  possibility	  of	  catastrophe	  looms,	  human	  history	  would	  be	  much	  more	  pacific.	  To	   be	   clear,	   we	   agree	   with	   the	   premise	   underlying	   Waltz’s	   argument:	   that	  conventional	  wars	  could	  only	  occur	  between	  nuclear-­‐armed	  states	   if	   leaders	  were	  willing	  to	   embrace	   major	   risks.	   	   He	   does	   not	   think	   that	   will	   happen;	   we	   see	   that	   occurring	  throughout	  the	  pages	  of	  history.	  	  If	  leaders	  were	  not	  willing	  to	  take	  enormous	  risks,	  China	  and	  Syria	  would	  not	  have	  launched	  major	  ground	  attacks	  on	  nuclear-­‐armed	  states,	  people	  would	  have	  never	  rebelled	  against	  empires,	  and	  few	  of	  the	  major	  wars	  of	  the	  modern	  era	  would	  have	  occurred.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Choe	  Sang-­‐Hun,	  “South	  Korea	  Publicly	  Blames	  the	  North	  for	  Ship’s	  Sinking,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  May	  19,	  2010;	  Sang-­‐Hun,	  “South	  Korea	  Returns	  Fire	  After	  Shots	  From	  North,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  August	  10,	  2011.	  
	   	   	  	  
	  
44	  
CONCLUSION	  What	  are	  the	  implications	  of	  our	  analysis	  and	  findings?	  	  At	  the	  most	  basic	  level,	  our	  report	   suggests	   the	   need	   for	   policymakers,	   analysts,	   and	   scholars	   to	   reconsider	   the	  challenges	  of	  nuclear	  deterrence	  in	  the	  21st	  Century	  and	  the	  incentives	  that	  U.S.	  adversaries	  have	  to	  employ	  nuclear	  weapons	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  conventional	  conflict.	  	  Most	  scholars	  and	  analysts	  of	  deterrence	  dismiss	  the	  likelihood	  of	  intentional	  nuclear	  attack	  by	  one	  state	  on	  anther,	  especially	   the	  possibility	  of	  an	   intentional	  nuclear	  attack	  by	  a	  country	  against	   the	  United	   States.	   	   Similarly,	   within	   the	   U.S.	   military,	   regional	   war	   planners	   generally	   treat	  conventional	  conflicts	  as	  the	  “base	  case”	  and	  relegate	  consideration	  of	  escalation	  to	  a	  war	  plan’s	  annex.	  	  But	  those	  analysts	  and	  war	  planners	  should	  reconsider	  why	  they	  assume	  that	  adversaries	   will	   keep	   their	   most	   powerful	   weapons	   on	   the	   sidelines,	   even	   as	   those	  adversaries	  suffer	  terrible	  military	  defeats.	  	  Historically,	  weak	  states	  with	  nuclear	  weapons	  planned	  to	  use	  them	  in	  an	  escalatory	  fashion	  to	  prevent	  military	  defeat	  –	  and	  in	  fact,	  that	  was	   NATO’s	   strategy	   throughout	   most	   of	   the	   Cold	   War.	   	   Even	   today,	   the	   strategy	   of	  stalemating	   nuclear	   escalation	   is	   a	   core	   part	   of	   Russia’s	   and	   Pakistan’s	   stated	   nuclear	  doctrine,	  and	  it	  is	  also	  probably	  Israel’s	  doctrine	  if	  that	  state	  were	  to	  suffer	  an	  unexpected	  military	   collapse.	   	   If	   the	   risk	  of	  wartime	  escalation	   is	  high,	   as	  we	  have	  argued	  here,	   then	  analysts	  –	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  of	  government	  –	  need	  to	  develop	  richer	  theories	  of	  intra-­‐war	  deterrence	  and	  escalation	  control	  during	  regional	  conflicts.	  	  	  	   In	  addition	  to	  this	  call	  for	  analytical	  reinvigoration,	  our	  analysis	  makes	  two	  critical	  recommendations	  for	  U.S.	  defense	  planners	  to	  mitigate	  the	  coming	  dangers.	  	  First,	  we	  urge	  the	   reevaluation	  of	   existing	   regional	  war	  plans	  –	   and	   conventional	   concept	  of	  operations	  (CONOPS)	  –	  to	  assess	  their	  suitability	  for	  waging	  conventional	  war	  against	  nuclear-­‐armed	  adversaries	  without	  triggering	  escalation.	  	  Second,	  this	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  as	  the	  United	  States	  considers	  the	  future	  size	  and	  shape	  of	  its	  nuclear	  arsenal,	  the	  challenges	  of	  intra-­‐war	  deterrence	   and	   escalation	   control	   should	   be	   paramount	   considerations.	   	   Each	   of	   these	  issues	  is	  discussed	  briefly	  below.	  
Implications	  for	  War	  Plans	  and	  Conventional	  CONOPS	  The	  first	  recommendation	  of	  this	  analysis	  is	  that	  the	  critical	  goals	  of	  escalation	  prevention	  and	  escalation	  control	  must	  be	  worked	  into	  the	  very	  core	  of	  U.S.	  regional	  war	  plans,	  at	  least	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when	   facing	   nuclear-­‐armed	   adversaries.	   This	   recommendation	   has	   at	   least	   two	  implications.	  	  	  First,	   when	   creating	   plans	   against	   nuclear-­‐armed	   adversaries,	   U.S.	   regional	  commands	   should	   develop	   both	   limited	   and	   decisive	   military	   options,	   to	   provide	  alternatives	  for	  U.S.	  political	  leaders.	  In	  many	  cases,	  limited	  contingency	  plans	  may	  already	  exist.	   However,	   what	   is	   essential	   –	   and	   perhaps	   lacking	   –	   is	   ensuring	   that	   the	   limited	  options	  are	  not	  merely	  limited	  in	  the	  endstates	  they	  seek,	  but	  that	  they	  are	  also	  limited	  in	  the	  operations	   they	  entail.	   	   In	  particular,	   limited	  war	  plans	  designed	  to	  prevent	  adversary	  escalation	   –	   by	   demonstrating	   that	   the	   enemy	   leadership	   will	   survive	   the	   war	   –	   should	  probably	   not	   seek	   to	   destroy	   the	   enemy’s	   national-­‐level	   command	   and	   control,	   directly	  target	  senior	  enemy	  leaders,	  or	  seek	  to	  destroy	  adversary	  strategic	  forces.	  Those	  would	  all	  be	  logical	  operations	  in	  a	  war	  designed	  to	  achieve	  decisive	  objectives,	  but	  they	  are	  counter-­‐productive	  in	  a	  limited	  war.	  	  This	   simple	   observation	   –	   that	   military	   operations	   must	   be	   consistent	   with	  campaign	   objectives	   –	   may	   seem	   obvious,	   but	   ensuring	   this	   consistency	   given	   the	  complexity	  of	  modern	  military	  forces	  is	  a	  substantial	  challenge.	   	  In	  1991,	  for	  example,	  the	  United	   States	   conducted	   a	   limited	   war	   to	   eject	   Iraqi	   forces	   from	   Kuwait,	   while	   leaving	  Saddam	  Hussein’s	  regime	  in	  power	  (to	  dissuade	  him	  from	  using	  his	  chemical	  and	  biological	  weapons,	   and	   to	   avoid	   the	   costs	   of	   occupation).	   But	   although	   the	   Coalition’s	   goals	  were	  limited,	  the	  air	  operation	  involved	  hundreds	  of	  strikes	  against	  Iraqi	  command	  and	  control	  and	  senior	  leadership	  targets.	  	  U.S.	  air	  operations	  in	  1991	  made	  sense	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	   destroying	   Iraqi	   military	   capabilities,	   but	   were	   inconsistent	   with	   the	   overarching	  objective	   of	   leaving	   the	   Iraqi	   regime	   in	   power	   –	   and	   signaling	   that	   restraint	   to	   the	   Iraqi	  leadership.55	  	   The	   essential	   point	   is	   that	   the	   United	   States	   requires	   both	   limited	   and	  decisive	   military	   options,	   and	   that	   the	   limited	   plans	   must	   be	   internally	   coherent	   –	   i.e.,	  limited	  not	  only	  in	  their	  goals	  but	  also	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  operations.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Similar	  contradictions	  could	  arise	  in	  a	  future	  war	  on	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula.	  	  A	  limited	  Combined	  Forces	  Command	  (CFC)	  war	  plan	  might	  seek	  to	  avoid	  North	  Korean	  escalation	  by	  having	  CFC	  ground	  forces	  advance	  only	  a	  few	  kilometers	  north	  of	  the	  DMZ	  –	  remaining	  far	  south	  of	  Pyongyang.	  	  But	  if	  the	  CFC	  air	  war	  plan	  entails	  air	  strikes	  throughout	  North	  Korea	  to	  blind	  adversary	  command	  and	  control,	  target	  senior	  leaders,	  and	  degrade	  its	  strategic	  forces,	  adversary	  leaders	  may	  reasonably	  interpret	  these	  operations	  as	  part	  of	  a	  decisive	  –	  not	  limited	  –	  campaign.	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The	  second,	  related,	  implication	  is	  the	  need	  for	  concepts	  for	  conventional	  operations	  (CONOPS)	   that	   can	   produce	   the	   favorable,	   one-­‐sided	   conventional	   engagements	   that	   the	  United	   States	   has	   come	   to	   expect	   without	   degrading	   the	   adversary’s	   national-­‐level	  command	  and	   control	   or	  directly	   targeting	   enemy	   leadership.	  The	  new	  American	  way	  of	  war	  –	  destroying	  enemy	  command	  and	  control	  –	  is	  a	  central	  reason	  why	  the	  United	  States	  has	  been	  able	  to	  produce	  such	  favorable	  battlefield	  outcomes	  in	  past	  decades.	  Limiting	  U.S.	  attacks	  on	  adversary	   sensors,	   command	  sites,	   communications	  hubs,	   and	   leadership	  may	  be	  essential	  for	  avoiding	  escalation,	  but	  those	  restrictions	  would	  come	  at	  a	  cost,	  perhaps	  a	  steep	   one,	   in	   terms	   of	   U.S.	   battlefield	   effectiveness.	   	   The	   challenge	   is	   for	   U.S.	   military	  planners	   to	   develop	   CONOPS	   that	   will	   enable	   the	   United	   States	   to	   create	   one-­‐sided	  conventional	   victories,	   and	   yet	   leave	   the	   enemy’s	   senior	   leadership	   with	   sufficient	  situational	  awareness	  to	  see	  that	  U.S.	  objectives	  are	  truly	  limited.	  	   To	  be	  clear,	  the	  development	  of	  limited	  war	  plans	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  limited	  war	  is	  always	   the	   best	   approach	   when	   confronting	   nuclear-­‐armed	   adversaries.	   	   In	   some	   cases,	  wars	   may	   be	   triggered	   by	   events	   that	   compel	   U.S.	   leaders	   to	   pursue	   decisive	   victory,	  conquest,	  and/or	  regime	  change	  –	  even	  if	  the	  enemy	  has	  nuclear	  weapons.	   	  Furthermore,	  restricting	  U.S.	   conventional	   operations	   and,	   in	   particular,	  withholding	   attacks	   on	   enemy	  strategic	  weapons	  involves	  major	  risks.	  	  But	  our	  overarching	  point	  is	  simple:	  if	  the	  analysis	  in	   this	   paper	   is	   sound,	   then	   future	   adversaries	   have	   a	   powerful	   incentive	   to	   use	   nuclear	  coercion	   to	   stalemate	   U.S.	   conventional	   military	   power.	   	   Given	   that	   reality,	   the	   United	  States	  should	  develop	  both	  limited	  and	  decisive	  military	  options	  for	  wars	  against	  nuclear-­‐armed	   adversaries:	   limited	   options	   to	   try	   to	   prevent	   adversary	   escalation,	   and	   decisive	  options	   for	   those	   circumstances	   in	   which	   escalation	   prevention	   has	   already	   failed,	   is	  deemed	  impossible,	  or	  is	  a	  lower	  priority	  than	  achieving	  decisive	  victory.	  	  Half-­‐steps	  in	  this	  direction	  –	  such	  as	  contingency	  plans	   that	  are	   limited	   in	   the	  endstates	   they	  seek,	  but	  are	  not	  limited	  in	  the	  operations	  they	  entail	  –	  may	  pose	  the	  greatest	  dangers	  of	  escalation	  by	  obscuring	  the	  escalatory	  potential	  of	  a	  regional	  conflicts.	  
Implications	  for	  U.S.	  Nuclear	  Force	  Structure	  	   A	  second	  major	  implication	  of	  this	  study	  is	  that	  proposals	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  U.S.	  nuclear	   arsenal	   should	   be	   assessed	   against	   the	   deterrence	   mission	   that,	   based	   on	   this	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analysis,	  seems	  to	  be	  both	  “most	  demanding”	  and	  “most	  likely”:	  preventing	  and	  mitigating	  escalation	   during	   a	   conventional	   conflict.56	  	   Public	   debates	   about	   the	   future	   of	   the	   U.S.	  nuclear	  arsenal	  often	  assess	  the	  force’s	  adequacy	  solely	  against	  the	  missions	  of	  peacetime	  assurance	  and	  peacetime	  deterrence.	  But	  nuclear	  deterrence	  must	   succeed	  all	   the	   time	  –not	   just	   during	   peace.	   Nuclear	   deterrence	   must	   succeed	   even	   when	   U.S.	   enemies	   are	  engaged	  in	  conventional	  wars	  and	  fighting	  for	  their	  lives.	  	  The	  analysis	  in	  this	  report	  of	  U.S.	  options	  in	  the	  face	  of	  adversary	  nuclear	  escalation	  –	   the	   “four	   grim	   options”	   discussed	   above	   (pp.	   19-­‐25)	   –	   suggests	   that	   the	   two	   primary	  choices	   for	  U.S.	   leaders	   (accepting	  a	   cease-­‐fire	  or	   conducting	  a	  disarming	   strike)	  become	  only	   one	   option,	   ceasefire,	   unless	   the	   United	   States	   has	   palatable	   disarming	   strike	  capabilities.	   	   Stated	   differently,	   unless	   the	   United	   States	   has	   palatable	   disarming	   strike	  options,	   nuclear	   coercion	   against	   the	  United	   States	   during	   a	   conventional	  war	  will	   likely	  succeed,	  and	  thus	  deterring	  a	  coercive	  strike	  will	  be	  very	  difficult.	  	  Ensuring	  that	  the	  United	  States	  can	  respond	  effectively	  to	  nuclear	  coercive	  threats	  is	  thus	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  U.S.	  deterrent,	  and	  the	  foundation	  of	  U.S.	  efforts	  to	  assure	  its	  allies.	  A	  credible	  deterrent	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  conventional	  war	  should	  give	  U.S.	  leaders	  a	  range	  of	  retaliatory	  options,	  including	  the	  ability	  to	  respond	  to	  nuclear	  attacks	  with	  either	  conventional	  or	  nuclear	  strikes,	  to	  retaliate	  with	  strikes	  against	  an	  enemy’s	  nuclear	  forces	  rather	   than	   its	   cities,	   and	   to	  minimize	   casualties.	   	   Deterrence	   during	   conventional	   wars	  would	   thus	   be	   enhanced	  by	   an	   arsenal	   that	   included	   capabilities	   to	   conduct	   prompt	   and	  accurate	   strikes,	   using	  high-­‐	   or	   low-­‐yield	  weapons,	   against	   enemy	  nuclear	   forces.	   This	   is	  not	   a	   call	   for	   brand	   new	   nuclear	   capabilities:	   the	   foundation	   for	   this	   flexible	   deterrent	  already	  exists.	  	  The	  question,	  however,	  is	  whether	  those	  flexible	  retaliatory	  options	  will	  be	  preserved	   in	   the	   force	   as	   the	   arsenal	   shrinks	   –	   especially	   in	   the	   face	   of	   proposals	   to	  consolidate	  from	  a	  triad	  to	  a	  dyad,	  and	  to	  greatly	  reduce	  arsenal	  size.	  	  	   In	   short,	   if	   the	   United	   States	   hopes	   to	   deter	   adversary	   nuclear	   escalation	   during	  future	   conventional	   conflicts,	   it	   needs	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   threat	   of	   its	   own	   nuclear	  operations	  is	  credible	  to	  adversaries.	  	  If	  deterrence	  fails,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  must	  defend	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  See,	   for	   example,	   Keir	   A.	   Lieber	   and	   Daryl	   G.	   Press,	   “The	   Nukes	   We	   Need:	   Preserving	   the	   American	  Deterrent,”	  Foreign	  Affairs	  (November/December	  2009),	  pp.	  39-­‐51.	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its	   forces	  and	  the	   forces	  and	  populations	  of	  regional	  allies,	   then	  a	  robust	  and	  flexible	  U.S.	  nuclear	  force	  structure	  would	  be	  a	  vital	  necessity.	  	  	  	  	   Taking	  a	  step	  back,	  the	  findings	  from	  this	  report	  may	  be	  startling	  for	  most	  defense	  and	   international	   security	   analysts	   –	   but	   they	   should	   not	   be	   surprised.	   	   Historically,	   we	  know	  that	  weak	  countries	  have	  planned	  to	  use	  nuclear	  weapons	  coercively	  to	  stalemate	  the	  strong.	  	  We	  know	  that	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  NATO	  allies	  were	  resolved	  to	  do	  exactly	  this	  when	  they	  felt	  weak.	  	  We	  have	  contemporary	  public	  statements	  by	  several	  so-­‐called	  “weak”	  countries	  that	  confirm	  that	  they	  currently	  view	  their	  nuclear	  weapons	  in	  this	  manner,	  and	  plan	   to	   use	   their	   weapons	   to	   stalemate	   powerful	   enemies.	   	   And	   we	   know	   that	   U.S.	  conventional	  CONOPs	  envision	  the	  United	  States	  fighting	  conventional	  wars	  by	  blinding	  our	  enemies	  and,	  in	  many	  cases,	  targeting	  adversary	  strategic	  weapon	  systems.	  	  And	   yet,	   among	   many	   in	   the	   U.S.	   nuclear	   weapons	   community,	   the	   disarmament	  community,	  and	  more	  broadly	  across	  the	  U.S.	  military,	  it	  is	  a	  standard	  assumption	  that	  no	  country	  would	  dare	  use	  nuclear	  weapons	  against	   the	  United	  States.	   	  To	   the	  contrary,	  our	  findings	   suggest	   that	   the	   deterrence	   challenges	   ahead	   are	   far	   more	   difficult	   than	   is	  generally	   imagined,	   and	   the	  deterrence	  mission	   in	  particular	   requires	   far	  more	  attention	  than	  it	  has	  recently	  been	  given.	  	  
